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SUMMARY
In the Spring of 2009, a new strain of pandemic influenza virus emerged in the
human population and spread to major countries worldwide. This caused panic that the
world was witnessing another influenza outbreak potentially of the size of the 1918 Spanish
Influenza outbreak where a fifth of the world’s population was affected. Although, this fear
did not come to pass, the threat of a potentially deadly outbreak remains. The ability
to mitigate and contain a disease is a vital aspect of any country’s response strategies.
Through modeling and simulation of the spread of an outbreak, decision-makers can better
plan mitigation and containment strategies. This dissertation investigates how changes in
human behavior affect the spread of pandemic influenza in the U.S. population using an
agent-based computational model. The dissertation argues that more aspects of human
behavior such as people’s attitudes and trust in government-issued health advisory infor-
mation about the disease need to be integrated into population-level models of pandemic
influenza to improve model realism. I present a framework for incorporating such factors
into computational models of disease spread to simulate possible scenarios that the spread
may take to improve policy insights. I created models to represent different configurations
of the attitudinal disposition of the population and then examined how agents representing
individuals responded to the interventions implemented. The study revealed that a popu-
lation that responds positively to government interventions reduced overall disease impact
in comparison to the other scenarios modeled. Although the model is built on the U.S.





Over the last decade or two global attention has been increasingly drawn to the potential
impact that fast-spreading, cross-border, severe infectious diseases can have on socioeco-
nomic stability, political life, and the national security of states [95, 223, 70, 84, 96]. In
the past, concerns about the impact of these communicable diseases in the population fo-
cused on those that are slow-spreading and predictable, thus more suitable for population
studies. Examples of such diseases include the human immunodeficiency virus infection and
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), sexually transmitted diseases (STDs),
polio, and malaria. Fast spreading respiratory diseases such as severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), pandemic influenza, and even highly virulent and increasingly drug re-
sistant pathogens (like Staphylococcus aureus) are getting renewed attention because they
now pose more of a global threat than previously acknowledged [166, 72].
While disease-causing microbes have threatened human health for centuries, they have
often been limited by the lack of an efficient transmission mechanism. However, the com-
bination of the rapid growth of the human population resulting in activities that expose us
more to deadly diseases—new and old, and our increased mobility which can aid their pro-
liferation, provides new fuel to age-long fears that fast-spreading severe infectious diseases
can potentially cause us large-scale societal disruptions, or even in the extreme case, extinc-
tion of our species [281, 259, 221]. Regardless, these diseases pose to us a near and present
danger and our ability to be better prepared to recognize and rapidly respond to their
spread in the population is important to decision-makers such as politicians, policymakers,
and health practitioners who seek to contain them.
Pandemic influenza is one of those fast-spreading diseases feared by decision-makers
because the pathogen is unpredictable, reoccurring, and can sometimes be virulent in the
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human population. The seasonal influenza outbreaks which we typically experience every
year is estimated to result in 25 – 50 million cases in the United States alone1, and between
30,000 – 40,000 deaths annually [248]. Yet this is viewed as mild in comparison to the
potential harm that the virus can cause. The best modern example we have of the damage
that pandemic influenza can cause is the 1918 – 1919 Spanish Influenza outbreak which
affected about one-fifth of the world’s population and killed an estimated 50 million people2
worldwide in about 18 months [293]. It affected about one-quarter of the U.S. population
(about 25 million people then [44]) of which about 675,000 (3%) died [104]. In comparison,
‘the great war,’ World War I, claimed just about 16 million lives, while ‘the good war,’ World
War II, the war to end all wars and the deadliest military conflict in history, claimed about
50 – 80 million lives [291]. When virulent, pandemic influenza viruses have the potential to
cause staggering and mortality cases of unimaginable proportions in the human population.
Because of the unpredictable nature of the virus, there is a high degree of uncertainty in
selecting response strategies to adequately mitigate and contain the outbreak of the disease
[114, 246]. In addition, the ability to generalize mitigation and containment strategies from
the risk factors of seasonal influenza to the pandemic version is also unclear. As a result
of these uncertainties, the science behind preparing and responding to pandemic influenza
can sometimes be vague, making the implementation of policy difficult [247]. Nevertheless,
policymakers, health practitioners, and other stakeholders interested in mitigating and con-
taining the disease need tools that can help them prepare and respond to an outbreak, even
if the science behind them are limited.
For decision-makers, a top question in their minds is: “How would a modern-day in-
fluenza pandemic affect the U.S. economy?” Putting a value on the impact helps in deter-
mining how to prioritize the problem and thus determine the importance of the preparedness
and containment tools. In this case, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that
1The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates the average global burden of seasonal influenza to be
as high as 1 billion cases and 3 – 5 million cases of severe illness [1].
2Why the Spanish Flu had such a high death toll is a subject of debate beyond the scope of this thesis.
Interested readers may consult [266, 232, 205, 224] for more discussion on some of the possible reasons.
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a pandemic on the scale of the 1918 outbreak could result in a loss of 5% of gross domes-
tic product (GDP), or a loss of national income of about $600 billion [213]. The need to
better underpin pandemic influenza policy decisions by improved disease spread models is
an imperative because those decisions can have significant economic repercussions, even if
their implications for other aspects of the basic functioning of society and national security
are not included [95, 223, 70, 84, 96].
Modeling and simulation offers these decision makers a suite of tools that can be used
to examine complex phenomena like the spread of infectious diseases and provide insights
into some of the dynamics involved when social interactions and population variation are
important factors. In particular, computational modeling3 (in comparison to traditional
mathematical models) offers the capability to capture more about the phenomena of interest
in the model in a rigorous way thereby greatly increasing the level of realism that can be
incorporated without sacrificing analytic focus [265].
In this dissertation, I investigate how changes in human behavior affect the spread
of pandemic influenza in the U.S. population using a computational model. The result
of this work is a model that can be used by decision makers to make projections of the
progression of a pandemic outbreak and its implications at the population level so that
better preparedness and response programs can be crafted. Policy modelers who tackle
complex problems like pandemic influenza need improved models like this to better underpin
policy decisions. Specifically, I used an agent-based modeling approach (a part of the
computational modeling toolkit) to create a framework for simulating possible scenarios
that a spread of the disease may take to improve policy insights. Because agent-based
models (ABMs) are generative4, they offer the additional advantage of an ability to uncover
potentially unanticipated system responses that an intervention or policy may trigger [86].
3A computational model broadly defined is a mathematical model used to study the behavior of complex
systems. Typically, it requires extensive computational resources. Examples of common computational
models include weather forecasting models, turbulent flow models, molecular protein folding models, and
earth simulator models. Some of the methods used to create the models in this domain include agent-based
models, artificial neural networks, and membrane computing [265].
4The term ‘generative’ is typically used in this context to mean the ability of an agent (in an ABM) to
sometimes display new complex behavior given simple behavior rules as input [86]. They are more commonly
referred to as ‘emergent’ behaviors.
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Importantly, ABMs are particularly useful tools for approximating real-world experiments
to inform policy choices for when setting up field experiments for the phenomena might be
expensive, unethical, time-consuming, or even outright impractical.
Although this study is focused on the U.S. population, the results obtained may be
applicable to other populations with similar attributes. However, it should be noted that
because computational models are more explanatory than predictive5, more effort would be
needed to re-parameterize the model developed here to suit other populations of study.
It is important to recognize that no model is perfect. While they can be used to forecast,
the results must be received with some caution as it is the model data and underlying
assumptions shaping the model algorithms that really determine the kind of results to be
obtained.
1.2 Pandemic Influenza & Human Behavior
Although modeling the impact of human behavior on the spread of infectious diseases such
as pandemic influenza is a discipline with a rich history steeped in traditional mathematical
modeling [153, 17, 10, 69, 109], progress in this discipline also requires integrating a wide
range of inputs from the behavioral sciences [108, 109]. The real challenge6 in this domain
centers on how to model the interplay between human behavior and the spread of infectious
diseases [87, 184]. Because both human behavior and the mechanisms of disease emergence
and spread in a human population are both complex processes, representing them in models
is challenging.
For pandemic influenza, the behaviors of interest are those preventive actions that can
affect the transmission of the disease, in this case, at the population level. These actions are
a combination of pharmaceutical (vaccination and antiviral drugs) and non-pharmaceutical
(all forms of social distancing) measures [100, 101, 181, 114, 179, 125]. Although it is still
5Prediction focuses on the output of a theoretical model while explanation focuses on the model itself [265,
p. 5]. Computational modeling largely focuses on the model itself in an effort to increase model complexity
by adding more real-world attributes to increase the explanatory power of the model (i.e., increase the
descriptive realism of the models).
6This challenge has given rise to a new discipline called Behavioral Epidemiology – a new branch of
epidemiology focused on the complex interplay between the determinants of human behavior (for example,
risk perception and information) and the transmission and control of infectious diseases [184]. It integrates
a wide range of tools and insights from the behavioral and traditional sciences.
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unclear how and why people choose these behaviors (or comply with the health advisory
information issued by authorities to protect themselves), the general assumption is that
most people would like to take preventive measures against the disease. However because
different people have different opinions toward what constitutes their safety, they may
take different (and some times, contradictory) courses of action yet have the same goal in
mind. For instance, while one individual may have a favorable attitude towards accepting a
pandemic vaccine, the other may have an unfavorable attitude and thus reject it. Further,
another individual may have an indifferent attitude towards the vaccine and so arbitrarily
decide to accept or reject it [252, 139, 253, 288]. In addition, both behavior and disease also
influence each such that it can sometimes be difficult to tease out the direction of causality
between the two.
Incorporating these heterogenity in behaviors (across individuals, contexts, or time)
and variations in causality into modeling frameworks can be quite challenging because of
the computational complexities involved. Yet these behavior-disease models are vital for
improved model realism because they have policy implications for mitigating the disease
[179, 126, 302, 99, 211, 100, 222, 175, 181, 109]. Unlike traditional mathematical models,
computational models that are spatially explicit7 are best for modeling disease spread phe-
nomena because the features of interest can be explicitly incorporated into the model and
the effects studied.
Although several models have been proposed to study human behavioral responses and
epidemic spread [89, 87, 160, 108, 109, 222, 139], and some have been applied to pandemic
influenza outbreaks with interesting results [226, 99, 100, 101], current large-scale population
models lack these psychological features that can help improve model realism [92, 219, 5,
218, 125, 64, 191, 98, 107]. These features such as perception and attitude towards disease
risk, play important roles in the spread of the disease as observed during the most recent
outbreak—the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza outbreak [262, 250, 270].
7The term “spatially explicit” is used in the sense of spatially explicit population models typically used in
ecological studies. These are models that combine a population simulator with a landscape map for studying
various effects on a population, for example, the effect of changing landscape features on population dynamics
[202]. This has given rise to “spatial epidemiology” where spatial variations in disease risk or incidence are
studied [216, 81, 233, 234].
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In this study, I introduce three psychological features—information (i.e., the ability
for agents to be informed about a disease in the course of an outbreak), attitude (i.e., an
agent’s inclination towards manifesting a behavior), and resolution (i.e., the decided course
of action) into a large-scale, multi-agent system for simulating the spread of pandemic
influenza. Because the behaviors are in response to a situation (shaping the perceived
risk of infection), I modeled them as happening “spontaneously” as is typical in these
kinds of studies [226, 99, 100, 101]. This means that they are conceived as happening
quickly. For example, when an agent in the system is presented with the option to vaccinate,
the agent decides immediately to accept, reject or be indifferent to it. This spontaneity
assumption enables us to bridge the intention-behavior gap8 by removing the time delay
between intention, in this case framed as the time between being informed about a disease
and the recommended protective actions to take, and the final action actually taken. Disease
spread is then simulated through modeling the interaction of the agents with each other,
which drives disease transmission.
The research questions raised by the above discussion are thus:
1. How do humans behave in general during a severe pandemic influenza outbreak?
2. How can human protective behaviors be represented in population models for simu-
lating the spread of pandemic influenza?
3. How can some of the heterogeneities in human behaviors be incorporated into a com-
putational model for simulating pandemic influenza spread in a population?
4. What are the policy implications of using such models as a basis for preparedness and
containment plans for the disease?
8The intention-behavior gap phenomenon is the discrepancy noticed between intentions and ultimate
behavior [102, 7, 8, 261, 255]. Expressed simply, an individual may develop an intention to change his or
her health behavior, but may end up not taking the action or fully carrying it out to its logical conclusion
(i.e., a form of the patience adherence problem [28, 91, 276]). How big the gap is remains unclear as several
complex psychological variables govern it.
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1.3 Dissertation Goal & Methodology
The main goal of this dissertation is to investigate how some of the preventive behaviors
humans exhibit during an outbreak of pandemic influenza in a population can be incorpo-
rated into computational models suitable for simulating pandemic influenza spread. This
goal is geared towards the development of a modeling framework that key decision makers
can use to examine policy intervention strategies for containing the spread of the disease.
The goal also aligns with the desire of the WHO Global Influenza Program (GIP) to provide
member states with strategic guidance and technical support to help member states better
prepare and deal with the threats of the disease [294].
The following objectives underpin the goal:
1. To research and document the behaviors people exhibit in response to the outbreak
of pandemic influenza in a population;
2. To develop a computational modeling framework that can model some aspects of these
spontaneous behaviors for simulation and analysis;
3. To examine some of the policy implications provided by the use of the model to
investigate alternative interventions.
To achieve the first objective, I conducted a comprehensive literature review of studies
that examined human responses to pandemic influenza, especially in the context of the most
recent outbreak which occurred in 2009. Although modeling the influence of human behavior
on infectious diseases has been a recent concern [108, 109, 107], adequately incorporating
the insights from these studies into modeling efforts is still quite challenging as noted by the
authors. My efforts at bringing psychological perspectives of human behavior into disease
modeling has resulted in a framework where such factors are recognized and developed into
a computational model.
To achieve the second objective, I developed a computational modeling framework based
on the Global Scale Agent-based Model (GSAM) developed by Parker and Epstein [219]. This
multi-agent system allows us to represent each individual in the population as a virtual agent
7
and equip them with the attributes of the behaviors desired.
Finally, using the model developed, I performed several scenario analyses to see how
varying disease parameters and behavior interventions impact the spread of the disease.
1.4 Contributions
The primary contributions of this dissertation as follows:
• A computational model framework that is capable of simulating spontaneous human
behavioral responses for pandemic influenza spread analysis. I developed a compu-
tational model framework, Multi-Agent Simulation System for Analyzing Pandemic
Influenza Spread (MASSAPIS), which is capable of modeling spontaneous human be-
havioral responses that take place in the context of an outbreak of pandemic influenza.
The framework extends the GSAM model by endowing agents in the model with spon-
taneous behavioral response capabilities such that agents can respond to the threat
of infection in different ways and thus impact the spread of the disease in a diverse
manner.
Agents in the model are ‘endogenized’ with three psychological features or constructs—
attitude, trust, and resolution to enable them to decide on how to choose preventive
behaviors in response to the outbreak.
• Added additional behavior capabilities to improve model versatility I improved the
versatility of the model for behavior-disease modeling by implementing three addi-
tional protective new features—vaccination, social distancing, and school closure in
the model to improve the versatility framework.
• An enhanced graphical user interface for configuring the model for scenario analysis to
inform policy. I extended the user interface with several menu options that added more
functionality to the model and also created a dashboard for displaying the simulation
results as the simulation progresses.
1.5 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is organized as follows:
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Chapter 2 documents research on artificial societies and emergent systems, human be-
havior and disease spread relevant to the dissertation. Studies in health behavior mod-
els, human behavior, disease spread dynamics, psychological factors affecting pandemic
influenza and current models of disease spread are also discussed and reviewed.
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical background and some frameworks to facilitate un-
derstanding of modeling human behavior and infectious disease systems. It draws from the
researches in the behavioral and traditional sciences as well as the recent 2009 outbreak to
lay the foundation for incorporating the psychological variables into the framework.
Chapter 4 describes the computational model—Multi-Agent Simulation System for An-
alyzing Pandemic Influenza Spread, a framework capable of simulating spontaneous human
behavioral responses to the threats of infection during a pandemic influenza outbreak. The
structure of the framework, computational methods, and essential procedures needed for
the operation of the model are described here.
Chapter 5 presents the simulation results, validation, and discussion. The simulation
results consists of plots of disease incidence and burden for different scenarios of disease
severity—ranging from a low-level to a high-level of infectiousness. The validation method
is described, underlying assumptions are stated, and the discussion on the results are pre-
sented.






In this section, I present some useful background information about influenza and epi-
demic modeling to contextualize my study. First, I present an introduction of the history
of influenza and discuss its emergence in the human population. Then, I summarize its
virology, biology, and taxonomy to familiarize the reader with the key issues that surround
the transmissibility of the disease as well as the mitigation and containment strategies
commonly employed. Second, I also present some background information pertinent to
modeling the spread of infectious diseases in the human population. Here, I briefly discuss
the historical emergence of epidemic modeling and spotlight the groundbreaking classical
susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model that revolutionized modern epidemic modeling
and is the foundation of the disease model used in this study. Finally, I briefly discuss the
types of epidemic models and introduce computational, agent-based, epidemic modeling to
the reader.
2.2 Influenza
It appears that influenza, or ‘the flu,’ as it is commonly known, may have been around
for thousands of years, with six thousand years a reasonable estimate. Since the earliest
descriptions of influenza-like disease by Hippocrates, the ‘Father of Western Medicine’ in
412 BC [20], and the numerous outbreaks reported in the middle ages1, to the first recorded
account of the pandemic in modern history in Russia in 1580 [227], to the 1918 pandemic
which infected nearly a quarter of the world’s population and resulted in deaths estimated
close to 100 million people [266, 232, 224], influenza has lefts its mark clearly on human
history as an old enemy emerging with new threats and as one of the most feared killer
1For example, an Irish manuscript in the fourteenth century mentioned an epidemic in Ireland with
symptoms similar to influenza (and seen in the British Islands in 1510 [268, p. 1])
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diseases of our time that cannot be cured but only contained.
The influenza virus can exist2 in an endemic, epidemic, or pandemic state in a popu-
lation [158, 159]. For clarity, an endemic disease refers to diseases that are present in the
population and remain so at a low-level of potentiation (i.e., affecting only a small number
of people) for a long period of time. An epidemic on the other hand affects a significantly
larger number of people in a region or country at the same time (usually for a short time
period of time) before the disease is contained and stopped. A pandemic, however, is an
epidemic that spreads beyond the region or country where the disease emerged, and often
with high morbidity and mortality rates. The seasonal influenza that we see yearly comes
in either endemic or epidemic forms [227], but the major outbreaks that are pandemic in
nature are the focus of this dissertation.
Influenza’s viral mechanism constantly changes to perpetuate the disease, hence, its apt
description as an “unvarying disease caused by a varying virus” [158]. Its varying features
include generation by different genetic mechanisms originating from animal populations
or human populations or from a mix of both populations3 [284]. The pandemic-prone
virus is often novel, occurring irregularly (typically, every 10 - 50 years in recorded history
[292, 293, 159]), in multiple outbreaks or “waves” [179, 266, 200, 131], and varying greatly
in severity [140, 176]. These traits also result in variation in the level of responses taken to
address the disease [100, 101, 181, 114]. Information on the four major influenza pandemics
of the last one hundred layers is summarized in Table 1.
The most recent pandemic, the influenza A/H1N1 outbreak of 2009-2010 (also known as
the Swine Flu4 outbreak of 2009), gave the world its first major pandemic in about 41 years.
The virus, first recognized in 1919, arose as a result of a series of genetic shuffling events
(viral re-assortments often through co-infection) between avian, swine, and human influenza
2Influenza viruses exist in both human and animal populations and remain in circulation in both popu-
lations for a long time period [158]. Its spread in the human population is the focus of this study, and its
role in animal reservoirs is not considered here.
3Webster et al.’s hypothesis is that aquatic birds are the primordial source of all influenza viruses and
that pigs probably serve as intermediate hosts in the genetic exchange. Geographically, they suggest that
most new pandemic influenza viruses originate from southern China making the Southeast Asia region the
‘cradle’ which may originate the next virus [284].
4Sometimes it is referred to in literature as swine-origin influenza virus—S-OIV [112, 115] or pandemic
H1N1 (pH1N1) virus.
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Source: The first three rows of this Table was obtained from [293, p. 13]; the last row data (Swine
Flu) was obtained from the following sources—area of emergence [271], ii) estimated reproductive
number [303], estimated case fatality rate [152], estimated attributable excess mortality worldwide
[72], and age groups most affected [62].
viruses in circulation to produce the 2009 A/H1N1 virus strain in a swine reservoir. This
became the first virus of pandemic potential that did not emerge with a distinct subtype5
but rather a variant of the 1918 virus. It was also the first in recent history to emerge from
North America [115], and not the region of Southeast Asia/China where most have come
from [284].
It is not known when the next pandemic will strike, however, experts believe that the
world is due for another one soon. In fact, the history of pandemics reminds us that each
passing year of non-incidence brings us closer to the coming outbreak. As the world gets
increasingly more interconnected, interdependent, and highly mobile, infectious diseases
such as pandemic influenza will pose an even greater risk to modern civilization than ever
before [156].
2.2.1 Virology, Biology, and Taxonomy
Influenza is a highly contagious respiratory tract infection caused by influenza viruses of
the Orthomyxoviridae family that can infect both humans and animals [68, 105]. Three
5See Section 2.2.1 for an explanation of this term.
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antigenetically distinct types of the viruses are known to exist—types6 A, B, and C. Types
A and B are common causes of the acute respiratory illnesses associated with the name of
the disease. However, it is the type A viruses that have the genetic potential to become
pandemic, and are thus the focus of this study. This is because type A viruses have the
capacity to change forms and be transmitted from animals to man—a requirement for an
outbreak in the human population. Type B viruses cause most of the seasonal epidemics
while the type C viruses are believed to cause mild infections, endemics, and in some cases,
cause infections with no symptoms at all.
The type A viruses are further categorized into subtypes according to the antigenic and
genetic nature of two main proteins found on the surface of the virus cell. These glycopro-
teins are known as hemagglutinin (abbreviated in literature as H or HA) and neuraminidase
(abbreviated as N or NA) proteins. Hemagglutinin agglutinates (i.e., clumps) human red
blood cells and catalyzes a cell’s absorbing the virus while neuraminidase cleaves sialic acid
from the cell surface and progeny virions7 to catalyze the release of the virus from infected
cells8. For classification, the proteins are designated by numeric numbers that identifies
the strain. For example, the “H5N1” virus designates an influenza A subtype that has 5
hemagglutinin and 1 neuraminidase proteins. Currently, up to 18 H and 11 N proteins
have been identified [269]. In reality, many different combinations of H and N proteins are
possible, hence creating potentially many different subtypes. Most circulate in the avian
population [9], and in some mammals—for example, horses (H7N7 and H3N8) and even in
dogs (H3N8) [54]. In the human population, viruses with four different H subtypes (H1,
H2, H3, and H5) and two different N subtypes (N1 or N2) have been identified [217, 73],
however, health authorities believe two chief subtypes—H1N1 and H3N2 are currently in
general circulation as at today [54]. Figure 1 shows a summary view of the major human
influenza virus subtypes in modern history and the relative dates of their introduction into
circulation. Influenza B viruses are not known to exist in different subtypes [68].
6Type A was first isolated in 1933 [260], type B in 1940 [106], and type C in 1947 [267].
7A virion is the complete infective form of a virus outside of a host cell. It consists of an outer protein
shell called a capsid and nucleic acid core–either deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA).
8Interested readers may check the following references for a more detailed understanding of the structure
and function of these proteins: hemagglutinin—[48, 289, 296, 295, 263], and neuraminidase—[42, 249, 188, 4].
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Figure 1: A timeline of influenza A viruses circulating in the human population in the last
100 years—three different hemagglutinin (H1, H2, and H3) and two neuraminidase (N1 and
N2) subtypes. The solid square boxes represent the introduction of the pandemic strains
H1N1, H2N2, H3N2, and H1N1 in 1918, 1957, 1968, and 2009 respectively (the major
pandemics). The solid black circle represents virus strains introduced in 1977 thought to be
variants of H1N1 subtype. The broken lines represent circulating strains based on serological
data although the evidence is indirect. Source: Based on Palese’s figure in [217, p. S83],
but modified to reflect the 2009 H1N1 pandemic which exhibited traits similar to the 1918
virus and the uncertainty of the 1977 pandemic.
As can be expected, a person’s immunity to the surface antigens reduces the likelihood
of infection, and if infection occurs, reduces the severity of the disease [228, 67, 63]. Hence
antigenic variation in the two glycoproteins drive the long-term epidemiological success
of the virus. The variation occurs two principal ways—by antigenic shifts and drifts. In
the first case, antigenic shifts describes a situation whereby the virus emerges with a new
hemagglutinin segment in the human population and as such people lack immunity to the
new strain and thus are susceptible to infection despite previous infection or vaccination.
This shift may occur as a result of genetic reassortment between animal and human influenza
A viruses, or between a progeny virus with a known virus in general circulation. The
emergence of this new genetic hemagglutinin segment may take place with or without a
new neuraminidase segment. The end result is a new influenza A virus subtype that has a
high probability for rapid spread since most of the population lacks the needed immunity
to the novel virus. Antigenic drifts on the other hand takes place via a variety of random
mutations or ‘drifts’ to create different influenza A strains of the specific subtype. This
drift is the virologic basis for the seasonal influenza epidemics we experience and the basis
for the making of new vaccines to match the new strains that emerge.
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2.2.2 Transmission, Signs, and Symptoms
Like most infectious diseases, influenza is spread directly when an infected person makes
“adequate contact” with a susceptible individual [3]. For example, an infected person may
expel the virus by sneezing, coughing, or even talking in the close proximity of a susceptible
person [168]. The viruses enter the body through the mucus membranes of the individual’s
nose, eyes, or mouth [47].
It is important to note that not all signs and symptoms associated with influenza are
caused by the virus. Some symptoms result from other secondary infections that may or
may not be related to influenza activity. Hence, clinical confirmation is needed to definitely
isolate influenza cases. As a result, the signs and symptoms are said to identify “influenza-
like-illnesses” otherwise called ILL [204].
Many times, it is the complications from the infection that cause the second-order effects
that increases influenza’s morbidity and mortality rate. For example, pneumonia is the most
commonly seen complication [205, 182, 39]. It can also worsen existing medical conditions
such as asthma, heart, and other pulmonary diseases.
Transmission of the virus from the onset of infection time varies. Viral shedding (i.e., the
virus leaving a cell) can take place as fast as a few hours from the start of the infection [47] or
later [181]. The manifestation of the illness can thus be sudden. Generally, the incubation
period is from 1 - 4 days with an average somewhere between 2 - 3 days [47, 100]. Others,
however, think it is takes more time [114] [181].
2.2.3 Mitigation and Containment Strategies
When an emerging influenza epidemic that is of pandemic potential breaks out in the human
population, different strategies are often employed to address it. The strategies involve a
series of graded responses based on a ‘subjective’ assessment of the severity of the disease.
For example, the responses could range from very limited interventions such as recommen-
dations to wash your hands after contact with certain individuals to very firm responses
such as travel bans and school closures in affected areas. In most cases, the decision makers
are playing catch-up to the outbreak since not much is typically known initially about the
15
genetic composition of the emergent virus to develop and deploy appropriate vaccines.
In essence, the strategies are a combination of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical
measures [100, 101, 181, 114, 179, 125]. The first and best line of defense is vaccination
(as an immunoprophylaxis) but vaccines are not immediately available because the virus is
novel, and current stockpiles will most likely not be useful because there is a high probability
that it will not be homologous-matched to the viral strain. Since a pandemic virus most
likely emerged by an antigenic shift, it is difficult to predict the new hemagglutinin genetic
segment of the virus hence difficult to produce a vaccine ahead of its emergence to match it.
Typically, drug companies produce vaccines by selecting possible ‘future’ candidate viruses
from the circulating pool, make the vaccines, and then stockpile them [248]. But because
the viral pool is populated by strains largely from a genetic drifting process, the predicted
strains have a high probability of not matching the pandemic strain. However, it may
match the seasonal strain that evolved by a shifting process. Thus the development of a
new vaccine is necessary when an outbreak occurs, but this takes time (may take up to 6
weeks after the incidence report).
Next in line of defense are antiviral drugs. They are considered the next best thing
and are used for prophylaxis (for example, targeted at different strategic subpopulations
[179, 181, 114]) and treatment (after infection). Like vaccines, antivirals (such as Tamiflu
made by Roche Holding AG) are stockpiled as part of a national preparedness and con-
tainment strategy. However, the rationale behind this action has been questioned. Critics
warn that millions of dollars may have been wasted on a drug that works no better than
Acetaminophen or Tylenol [110]. They point out that the claimed “drug did not prevent
the spread of flu or reduce dangerous complications, and only slightly helped symptoms,”
stoking a controversy of financial ties between the scientists who advised the WHO on the
policy and the drug makers [2]. Also, the issue of resistance to antiviral drugs makes [175].
Essentially, stockpiling vaccines and antivirals for pandemic influenza controversial.
Finally, non-pharmaceutical interventions such as social distancing aimed as reducing
contact, for example, school closures and travel bans, are deployed based on the need to
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balance between impact and the cost of the socioeconomic disruption they may cause. Al-
though much is yet to be understood regarding the dynamic patterns of human contact
[49, 243], it is generally accepted that different environments and contact patterns affect
the spreading of contagious diseases [82]. For instance, schools are particularly vulnera-
ble because of the close concentration of young children who are often very susceptible.
Consequently, school closures are commonly advocated in acute scenarios [117].
Symptomatic drugs such as over-the-counter (OTC) drugs that reduce the effects of
some of the symptoms (e.g., coughs, runny nose, and headaches) are also used as a form of
treatment, but they do not affect the progression of the virus so are not considered a major
factor. In general, the accepted view is that vaccination in combination with antiviral drugs
are the optimal tools to contain the spread [211].
Simulation studies suggest that the rapid activation of some of at least these plans can
help arrest the epidemic development of a novel strain [151].
2.3 Modeling Diseases Spread
Modeling the spread of diseases at the population level centers around estimating the num-
ber of people that will be infected when an outbreak occurs, or more specifically, ‘predicting’
the patterns of spread that a disease will exhibit and their consequences. Modelers want
to answer key questions like: How severe will an epidemic be? How has the disease been
spreading through different populations? What is the time period between infection and
onset of infectiousness? How many people will get infected? What will be the morbidity
and mortality rates? How many new infections will each infected individual produce? Will
current measures be enough to bring it under control? How should interventions such as
antiviral drugs and vaccinations be deployed? And, how long will an epidemic last?
Traditionally, mathematical modeling has been used to answer some of these questions
and has led to many fundamental ideas that have had significant impacts in epidemiology
[153, 17, 10, 69, 109]. However, because of different research agendas and very real challenges
such as numerical tractability, most epidemiological models are kept simple. As a result,
they fall short in addressing real-life public health questions that have lots of complexity
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such as human behavior, population heterogeneity, variations in the biology of both the
virus and human hosts, and variations in human contact patterns. While the simple models
are good for establishing broad principles, models that drive policy intervention plans need
to include at least some of these layers of complexity.
The rapidly increasing availability of computational resources with very high computing
power is now making it possible to incorporate some of these layers of complexity into
our models to help us better answer some of the questions posed above. This has led to
increasingly realistic epidemic models that leverage the availability of cheaper computational
power and improved data (for example, highly detailed census and mobility data) to produce
large-scale models that have been very useful for understanding the spread of a disease in
large populations to improve mitigation and containment strategies [219, 5, 218, 125, 64,
191]. These computationally explicit models can now incorporate facets of the disease
spread phenomenon with higher fidelity [86, 87, 89, 31, 15].
2.3.1 Disease Modeling History
The first application of modeling to the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases in a
human population can be traced back to John Graunt’s efforts to systematically quantify
the causes of deaths in London presented in his book: Natural and Political Observations
made upon the Bills of Mortality in 1662 [121]. In this book, Graunt analyzed the various
causes of death published weekly by London parishes over a period of about twenty years
and provided an imaginative yet systematic method for estimating the comparative risks
of dying from the main killers. Essentially, Graunt outlined the concept of what is now
considered as the “theory of competing risks” in modern epidemiology [69, p. 2]. Though
Graunt’s work was statistical and fascinating, it reached incorrect conclusions about the
plague of 1636 by inferring that “. . . the contagion of the plague depends more upon the
disposition of the air than upon the effluvia from the bodies of the men.” Graunt did not
rely on a mathematical model and also missed the idea of person-to-person contagion.
The earliest theoretical approach to mathematical modeling the spread of diseases was
undertaken by Daniel Bernoulli in 1766. In his seminal paper [24], Bernoulli studied the
18
mortality due to smallpox and mathematically showed how many lives in a population
could be saved if smallpox were eliminated as a cause. Ironically, Bernoulli’s work had
more immediate application in actuarial science than epidemiology9 because it showed how
to compute the gain in life expectancy in the context of competing risks [251, 71]. Bernoulli’s
novel work10 led to the possibility of controlling smallpox by vaccination.
The first contributions to modern mathematical epidemiology is generally attributed to
the work of P. D. EN’KO [78, 76] (nearly forty years before the Reed-Frost model which
was not described until 1952 [3]). In 1889, he published in Russian a discrete-time model
fitted to several cases of measles epidemics he observed in some closed boarding-schools in
St. Petersburg. Another significant addition to modeling was done by Ronald Ross who de-
veloped the first mathematical model of malaria transmission in 1908, which drove modern
theoretical epidemiology [238, 239]. Ross’ model was cutting edge in that it embodied hy-
potheses of how the phenomena worked (i.e., of how the malaria parasite was transmitted).
This work led to the possibility of managing malaria by controlling the vector population
(i.e., the mosquitoes) and also won Ross the Nobel prize for medicine in 1902. This thinking
of embodying hypotheses about how the world works into models of disease transmission
set out a new path for how epidemiologists approached disease spread modeling at that
time [189].
Building on works of Ross and others such as W. H. Hamer [127], McKendrick and
Kermack published their seminal work, A Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Epi-
demics in a set of three articles in 1927 [153], 1932 [154], and 1933 [155] that revolutionized
the field. Their work had such a huge influence on the development of mathematical models
for disease spread that they are still regarded as containing ideas relevant to contemporary
epidemiology. The Kermack—MckKendrick theory was profound for three main reasons.
First, it introduced continuous-time mathematics into epidemic modeling in a general way
(built on McKendrick’s work published the previous year [201]). Second, it proposed a
model that accounted for how the ‘age of infection’ (i.e., the time since becoming infected)
9Actually not until the survey article by [32] as noted by [77].
10It is worthy to note that scholars still continue to revisit Bernoulli’s work 200 years after the publication
reckoning that it still contains insights that have not yet been fully explored [80, 79].
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Figure 2: Schematic diagram of the classical susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) disease
model
affected disease transmission and recovery. This was an important concept that helped to
improve model realism. Third, Kermack and McKendrick established the existence of a
particular threshold number known as the basic reproduction number (R0) for which large
epidemics could only occur when crossed. The basic reproduction number is defined as the
average number of secondary cases generated by a primary infectious case in an entirely
susceptible population [10]. In a closed population, a disease can spread if R0 > 1, but dies
out eventually if R0 < 1. Hence, R0 can be used to critically characterize the spread of an
epidemic and is used for this purpose in this dissertation.
Their model was a simple, compartmented, deterministic model where the population
was demographically closed (i.e., no births or deaths allowed other than from the disease)
and the population can be divided into three distinct compartments— the susceptible (S)
compartment to contain healthy individuals vulnerable to the disease; the infected (I)
compartment to contain individuals currently infected with the disease; and the removed (R)
compartment to contain individuals that have either recovered from the infection and thus
immune to secondary infections (caused by the influenza virus) or removed from circulation
as a result of vaccination or death from the disease. For this reason, the model is generally
called the SIR model. Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of the classic SIR model
with these transition states. Many other variants of this basic model have since been
developed to suit different needs. The reader can consult the standard texts for reference
and application [10, 69, 17, 149].
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Interest in modeling the spread of epidemics actually waned after the 1970’s in favor
of endemic diseases that were considered more prevalent and pressing. It was not until
the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2002 - 2003 that interest in
epidemic modeling was renewed [33]. SARS took us back to the Kermack–McKendrick
model. Although the human immunodeficiency virus infection/acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (HIV/AIDS) epidemic spurred modeling interests in the early 1980’s, its long
timeline (i.e., incubation period) meant it could be modeled as an endemic disease with
demographic effects.
After SARS, it was the threats posed by the spread of the avian flu of 2005 [273, 285]
and more recently, the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic that spurred new interest in modeling
the spread of epidemics and pandemics.
2.3.2 Types of Epidemic Models
There are generally two types of epidemic models—deterministic and stochastic models.
The deterministic or compartmental models as they are also called are models in which the
model output is exclusively determined by the model’s history and input parameters. They
are predictable models that produce the same output for the same given initial conditions.
Most epidemic models in the literature have been deterministic. Specifically, most have been
expressed by differential equations [69, 34]. Stochastic models on the other hand imply the
presence of randomness and variable model parameters or states that are described by
different probability distributions [11, 169].
Another set of deterministic models are the spatial models that show infection on a
lattice [120]. This lattice or spatial approach takes into account heterogenous properties
of disease spread such as correlations and clustering. Several forms based on different
computational methods are possible here. For example, there are synchronous lattice models
built using cellular automata [197], asynchronous models built using monte carlo techniques
[74], and models built using agent-based computational techniques [85, 14].
Unlike the compartmental models, spatially explicit models allow us to add layers of
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complexity into the model framework thereby providing us very high fidelity representa-
tional capabilities required for better public health interventions. These models can better
depict realistic scenarios because they can include important features such as population
heterogeneity and can offer the opportunity to trace down processes to the individual level.
The future of population health modeling appears to be large-scale, computational spatial
models for infectious disease spread [64, 5, 219, 191, 174].
It is important to recognize that no model is perfect. They can be used to forecast, but
the results must be received with some caution. Because disease spread is a very complex
process, it is not feasible to define a model with all the necessary parameters required
to capture the disease spread process. Rather, models are tailored to specific questions,
and consequently they vary widely. For example, two models A and B might be used
to forecast the outcome of an epidemic. Model A may predict a casualty rate of 25%
while B predicts 75%. The reason for this difference is that both models embody different
underlying assumptions or hypotheses about how the real-world mechanism works. What
is key therefore is to understand the data, the underlying ideas and assumptions behind the
model, and the goals to be achieved. To state it in the apt words of Hethcote [135], there
are “a thousand and one epidemic models” for every disease.
2.3.3 Agent-based Modeling & Applications to Policy
Computational models are powerful modeling and simulation techniques for capturing emer-
gent phenomena resulting from the interactions of individual entities. Specifically, agent-
based modeling is a system modeled as a collection of autonomous decision-making entities
called agents that make individual decisions based on sets of rules [85, 14]. They are most
effective when used in situations where complexity and uncertainty are constraints that need
to managed in a multifaceted decision-making process. The complexities are features or at-
tributes peculiar to agents in a heterogenous population and the uncertainties are choices
or decisions to be made. In this modeling paradigm, neither constraint can be eliminated
but only traded-of against the other.
While the use of agent-based modeling for empirical research is well established in the
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sciences, its use in the social sciences, and in particular, the field of international affairs is
far less known. Scholars in the field of international affairs who have used this form of in-
quiry include Cederman who showed how democratic states manifest their behaviors based
on categorical traits of the agents. He did this using a series of agent-based computational
models to trace complex macrohistorical transformation of actors [55]. Essentially, politi-
cally relevant cultural traits of the actors in different ethnic landscapes can be ‘endogenized’
societally and simulated to see how the social processes evolve, i.e., how they capture or-
ganizational domination and then dominate a territorial state. Another good example is
Harrison’s reflections on the credible uses of agent-based models in international and global
studies [130]. However, this dissertation is about epidemic modeling and as such is focused
on the application of agent-based models (ABMs) to disease spread. The interested reader
can see Bruch and Atwell’s study for a recent summary of the application of agent-based
models in empirical social research [37].
According to Hammond [128], the use of ABMs to inform policy has its own peculiar
set of considerations (i.e., processes and challenges). He classifies their use to inform policy
into three specific “modalities” or distinct categories: prospective, retrospective, and indirect
policy models.
Prospective policy models are models that help to inform the design of policies or in-
terventions by clarifying the different potential impacts of those interventions on the phe-
nomena under investigation. These models incorporate key features about the phenomena
from the real world into the model along with explicit representations of policy choices
the agents can take. The policy choices can be made within the system and compared.
Essentially, they are ‘in silico’ experiments to understand the full potential consequences
of interventions. Retrospective policy models are focused on helping users retrospectively
understand the success or failure of a policy or intervention. In contrast indirect policy
models are models that do not contain explicit representation of policies or interventions,
but are rather aimed at helping users understand larger concepts such as etiology and bidi-
rectional relationships between individual behavior of agents and the system structure over
time. Models of infectious disease spread are typically framed as prospective models and
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treated as such in this study. Examples of retrospective agent-based modeling in political
science include works on party competition and bureaucratic policies [164, 165], and indi-
rect agent-based modeling in the social sciences include the canonical work on the drivers
of segregation [38, 300].
2.3.3.1 Application of agent-based models to infectious disease spread
Agent-based modeling is still relatively new to public and preventive health inquiries [183],
but they can be powerful public health research tools because of their ability to depict
how population-level behaviors emerge from different initial conditions (for example, dif-
ferent information and decision rules applied to different agents in the population). Ini-
tial applications11 were focused on the epidemiology and control of infectious diseases
[100, 101, 179, 178, 114, 303], but in recent times, the increasing availability of cheap
computational power has stirred up interest in embedding more layers of complexity in
such models to improve their realism [87, 219].
As part of the effort to increase the application of ABMs in public health inquiry,
the National Institute for General Medical Sciences (NIGMS), a division of the National
Institute of Health (NIH), funded a large network modelers to form the Models of Infectious
Disease Agent Study (MIDAS) group to broaden its use for substantial scientific and policy
impact [195].
In the next chapter, I review the state of the art in modeling spontaneous human behav-
ioral changes in response to the spread of pandemic influenza and discuss the foundation of
the modeling approach I adopt for this study.
11In perspective, ABMs have been applied to the spread of diseases in small town scenarios (population of
6,000 and 50,000 people [45]), large-scale urban cities (1.5 million people [93]), country scenarios [100, 101,
181, 114, 5], and at the global level [219].
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CHAPTER III
HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND DISEASE MODELING
3.1 Introduction
Modeling the impact of human behaviors on the spread of infectious diseases such as pan-
demic influenza is a novel discipline, but one based on a rich history of traditional mathemat-
ical modeling1 [153, 17, 10, 69, 109, 184]. Central to the modeling effort is how population
heterogeneities affect disease spread [179, 126, 302, 99, 211, 100, 222, 175, 181, 109, 107,
29, 26, 89, 87, 301]. Particularly in the context of severe infections where large portions of
a population are at risk, the implications of neglecting the interactions between a disease
and society can be costly [192, 200].
Several approaches have been proposed to study these interactions [89, 87, 160, 108,
109, 222, 139], and they have led to increasingly realistic spatial models that have been
very useful for understanding the spread of the disease in large populations allowing us
to improve mitigation and containment strategies [219, 5, 218, 125, 64, 191]. These new
models produce significantly better results than previous models and constitute the future of
epidemic modeling. However, even these models lack adequate “behavior details” important
for better model realism [87]. These current models focus on factors such as mobility-related
effects [193, 18, 191, 93, 119, 156], which although important, do not adequately capture key
population-level variables that may impact the spread of a disease. For example, variables
such as people’s attitudes towards the risk of infection and their trust in recommended
health advisory information issued by the government to contain the disease spread [242,
89, 222, 145, 252, 139, 173]. When these features are incorporated into models, they may
produce results that differ significantly from those models that lack them, and thus serve
to enrich the debate on mitigation and containment strategies.
1It worth noting that infectious diseases are also modeled in the domain of Economics where they are
called economic epidemiological models [113]. In this domain the focus is more on choices and economic
analysis thus not examined in this dissertation.
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In this chapter, I review some of the issues surrounding risk perception, trust, and
pandemic influenza spread. Since the effects of risk perception on health decisions have been
studied in the health belief model (HBM) literature [22, 141], I examine the literature for
insights on frameworks that could be applied to modeling pandemic influenza spread. I also
examine the literature on risk perception and pandemic influenza using the context of the
most recent outbreak, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic to better understand some of the factors or
constructs that modulated how people perceived and reacted to the risk of infection during
the outbreak. Recent studies on this suggest that psychological constructs such as people’s
attitude and trust in the health advisory information disseminated by the health authorities
shaped behaviors during the outbreak [252, 173, 43, 286, 240, 41]. To underscore the
importance of the constructs, I examine reports related to the recent 2014 Ebola outbreak
in West Africa to see if some of these constructs feature in the conversation since Ebola
disease is considered similar to pandemic influenza (in symptoms, severity, and spread).
3.2 Health Belief Model Theory & Influenza Modeling
Health belief model theory [22, 141] is found in a suite of models based on decision theory
and attitude-behavior constructs [83, 299, 102, 6]. It deals with behavioral changes with
respect to prescribed health recommendations. HBM attempts to model the processes an
individual uses to integrate recommended health information into the individual’s decision-
making processes. The goal is the adoption of the recommendations. Sometimes, this issue
is also called the patient adherence problem2. Theoretically, HBM is probably one of the
best of known frameworks developed to help us understand and explain patient adherence
and has been used extensively to develop and improve intervention strategies. But HBM
has been criticized as being “incomplete in its organization and development,” lacking in
robust validation, failing to clearly specify how the constructs involved are inter-related or
should be measured, have modest support for patience adherence, and is thus not well suited
for disease modeling [203, p. 439]. Especially for influenza, HBM is regarded as inadequate
for predicting and understanding influenza vaccination behavior (a key factor in influenza
2The patient adherence problem is defined in literature broadly as compliance to prescribed medical
interventions or advice, or enlisting patient cooperation to achieve therapeutic goals [28, 91, 276].
26
modeling) because it is missing important constructs that can help capture the motivations
for influenza-related behavioral changes, and hence alternative models are suggested [203].
Others scholars such as [287, 58, 35] have also noted some of these limitations. Weinstein
[287] challenged the validity or completeness of health behavior theories and posits that
testing the theories can often be misleading. Chapman and Coups [58] emphasized that
other constructs such as worry and regret, which are elements of emotions, are missing in
HBM frameworks but can significantly affect influenza vaccination decisions. They found
that the “ratings of anticipated worry and regret were stronger predictors of vaccination
than perceived risk and mediated the effect of risk on vaccination” [58, p. 86]. So for
instance, those who did not accept the influenza vaccine in the first year had high levels of
worry and regret and were thus more likely to accept the vaccine the following year. Brewer
et al. [35] pointed out that while constructs such as risk perception are central to many
health behavior theories, the relationship between these core concepts and behavior is often
not clear.
Weinstein and colleagues [288] actually examined the ability of several types of risk
perceptions measures and other types of constructs from health behavior theories to pre-
dict influenza vaccinations. They found “anticipated regret” to be the strongest predictor
of vaccination out of all the constructs they studied (included risk perception, worry, per-
ceived vaccine effectiveness, as well as anticipated regret). Crucially, they noted that “risk
perceptions predicted subsequent vaccination,” but more so, a better predictor when this
risk is “phrased in terms of feelings” rather than in purely cognitive terms [288, p. 146].
They pointed out that these theories are “missing some of the important determinants of
vaccination and need substantial modification to explain this and perhaps other behaviors”
[288, p. 151].
3.3 Risk Perception And The 2009 Pandemic Influenza
Seale et al. [252] surveyed a sample of residents in Sydney, Australia, during the 2009 H1N1
pandemic to determine among how the perceived risk of infection affected the likelihood of
accepting the pandemic vaccine. They found that while most participants did not believe
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they were at risk, slightly over half of the sample indicated their willingness to accept the
vaccine. They concluded that concerns about vaccine safety were present and of serious
concern during the outbreak and it impacted vaccine uptake. Others such as [139] found
the perceived risks of infection and the precautionary behaviors elicited to be dynamic
in time but differ geographically and demographically. In general, there is a similarity
in the patterns of the precautionary behaviors exhibited in a population in response to a
respiratory threat like pandemic influenza because the strategies for avoiding infection are
few and specific [100, 101, 181, 114].
Liao and colleagues [173] also examined factors affecting intention to receive the vaccine
in Hong Kong (N = 896 adults) and found similar concerns in their longitudinal study.
Interestingly, they examined the decision-making scheme used by the general population
using a modified Theory of Planned Behavior (TBP), one of the HBM theories. They
collected data before and after the vaccination and examined the data using their modified
TBP. They found among other things, that “perception of low risk (60%)” to the virus
and “concerns regarding adverse effects of the vaccine (37%)” were the primary reasons
why only 11% of the people that indicated intention to receive the vaccine actually got the
vaccine. They concluded that people’s perception of low risk of infection from the virus
and high risk of adverse effect from the vaccine inhibited vaccine uptake. They pointed out
that “intention alone” is not sufficient to predict future uptake rates because other proximal
determinants such as vaccination planning played more significant roles.
Essentially, there is a lack of theoretical work in this domain investigating risk percep-
tions and protective behaviors, and more so, a lack of modeling studies. Leppin and Aro
[170] reviewed several theoretical models and concepts (28 empirical studies from which
30 articles were published between 2003 and 2007) underlying current empirical research
on pandemic influenza risk perception. They found that the concepts of risk perception
discussed in the papers were mostly heterogeneous and used more in a “pragmatic than
theory-based sense” [170, p. 7]. Risk perception was not conceived completely as a cogni-
tive, or cognitive and emotional phenomenon, but a mix of both mediated by varying levels
of expectancies.
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Other scholars have also addressed this lack of theoretical framework. Bish and Michie
[26] reviewed relevant literature with references to SARS, Avian, and Swine Flu pandemics
and selected 26 papers they considered useful to describe conceptual frameworks that could
help us better understand perception and protective behaviors. They also found that most
of the studies “lacked an explicit theoretical framework.” Majority of the studies they re-
viewed were not model-based and thus not predictive (in fact they commented that most
of the studies were cross-sectional in nature and so could not be predictive anyway). While
they noted demographic differences in the adoption of behaviors, it did not significantly
affect their conclusions. Their key findings were thus: that perception (measured as two
constructs—greater levels of perceived susceptibility to and perceived severity of the dis-
eases) and belief (measured as a greater belief in the effectiveness of the behaviors recom-
mended) are important predictors of protective behavior. What they termed “belief” is
essentially a trust in the information released by health authorities. In fact, they high-
lighted that “greater levels of state anxiety and greater trust in authorities are associated
with behavior.” This hints at the notion of trust in information as an important construct
of risk perception.
3.4 Conceptualizing Trust in Information, and Disease Spread
The concept of trust is studied across many disciplines such as political science, psychology,
sociology, international relations, organizational behavior and management sciences, com-
puter science, and even more recently social media. However, there is a lack of convergence
on its definition and measurement across these disciplines. This is because there are differ-
ent concepts of trust applied in different categories, such as to individuals, governments, and
institutions. Thus there is a vagueness that pervades research on trust posing key challenges
for researchers seeking to advance knowledge in this domain [129, 136, 138, 254, 167, 283].
In the social sciences, researchers have been unable to ascertain robust predictors of
trust or confidence in government and have been using different forms of behavior as prox-
ies. The narrative common to them all has been that trust in government and confidence in
institutions has been declining since the 1960’s [65, 212, 231, 198, 198], in line with current
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opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center [148] and Gallup poll [111]. However,
this does not mean an abandonment of the system, rather the existence and rise of skepti-
cism [65]. Even in medical contexts where patients are expected to trust their physicians
and medical institutions, no commonly shared understanding exists, and where it does,
not much is known about the factors that affect it, and the behaviors it fosters [190, 124].
These vagueness has led to a proliferation of concepts, definitions, and measurement in-
consistencies across multiple fields leaving much to be understood on trust and thus one of
the chief problems in the field [16, 21]. Further more, others such as Bauer view trust as
external to the actual trust desired—more as “an expectation based on thought processes
and emotions” thus external to the concept of trust itself [21, p. 7]. This expectation is
purely subjective and varies from person to person as different individuals place different
values on the different factors that modulate trust.
Despite the lack of a robust theory on trust, the general sense is often framed in a three-
place predicate form A-B-X where the element A (the truster) trusts B (the trustee) based
on a subjective estimation (or beliefs) A has of the trustworthiness of B. Consequently, this
influences A’s display of relevant behavior or strategic consideration X towards B [16, 21].
In this dissertation, I focus on trust in the simple general active sense without adducing
evidence to the reasons. In this simple sense, the trust once assumed does not evolve. So
when I assume A trusts B, the trust does not vary.
However, variations exist in the expectations even when individuals receive the same
signal. For example, different individuals (trusters) can receive the same signal from a
trustee and yet have different estimation of the signal, leading to different levels of trust,
and thus they behave differently towards the trustee. For Bauer [21], trust is an expectation
and not a decision or behavior. Hence trust here is different from theories like expectation
utility theory [280, 103] and prospect theory [144] often used as a basis for trust. The
relationship of trust is even more complicated, when sentiments that affect vaccine uptake
are involved [41]. In general, trust is difficult to operationalize and measure, at best it is
vague or misapplied where defined [75, 264, 21].
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3.5 Insights From The Recent Ebola Outbreak
The Ebola virus disease like other hemorrhagic fevers is a viral disease that can easily
transmit from person-to-person causing illness and death on a large scale when severe [245].
Like pandemic influenza, homologous-matching vaccines are not immediately available and
there is no known cure. Those infected with the virus essentially have to wait-out the
virus actions within their bodies [97]. There is also a lack of modeling tools as part of
the containment strategy for another outbreak. This could be because the disease was
viewed in the past as an African problem, thus of less global concern [229]. However, the
most recent outbreak which occurred in 2013 (to 2015) has changed that view as it became
the most widespread epidemic of the disease in history. As a result, the World Health
Organization now considers this latest outbreak in West Africa an international emergency
that constitutes a global health risk (the worst in history and the most severe in the last
40 years) that deserves the same kind of response like the 2009 H1N1 outbreak commanded
[150, 56].
Insights from news reports about the disease suggest that people’s attitudes and trust in
information about the disease played significant roles in shaping behaviors adopted during
the outbreak. Keating suggests that “an effective response to a problem like Ebola requires
public trust of authorities in the midst of a terrifying situation” [147]. Essentially, a large
number of the population did not initially trust the government health advisory information
(on protective measures to take) during the early stages of the outbreak in a number of
the affected countries. For instance, noticeable levels of distrust was reported during the
Guinea outbreak [210]. In fact, the Executive Director of the African Center for global
Health and Social Transformation (ACHEST) remarked in observation that a “trust gap
has developed between the health system and the general population which has made control
efforts difficult in West Africa.” He crucially noted that “the single most important lesson we
learned was that building and holding public trust by the government and health personnel
is the foundation for all control efforts” [214]. Trust in government information on protective
actions to take during a severe outbreak of an infection like pandemic influenza or Ebola




In this chapter, I discussed disease models that incorporate human behaviors, and focused
on pandemic influenza. I discussed the importance of modeling as part of the preparedness
and containment planning efforts, highlighting that it serves as an important tool to help
us better understand the spread patterns of the disease and potential “tipping points” in
the infection trajectory—such that when crossed, the outbreak becomes a major disaster
[116, 177].
To gain a better understanding of how to incorporate behavior into influenza disease
models that underscore the importance of the role of risk perception, I examined the HBM
literature for insights on possible theoretical frameworks. I found that there was a lack of a
theoretical framework in this domain investigating risk perceptions and protective behaviors
[26], and more so, a lack of modeling studies [170]. I also highlighted the importance of
the concept of trust in this context and examined its role in the 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic and the 2013 Ebola virus disease outbreak for some insights. I found that trust
(in the health advisory information disseminated by the government), though discussed and
treated in many disciplines, is difficult to operationalize and measure. At best it is vague or
misapplied where defined [75, 264, 21]. In spite of the modeling challenges, risk perception
and trust in information are important constructs that should feature in pandemic influenza
disease models [286, 240, 160, 225, 252, 288].
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CHAPTER IV
A NEW COMPUTATIONAL EPIDEMIC FRAMEWORK —
MASSAPIS
This chapter describes a computational framework and model, Multi-Agent Simulation Sys-
tem for Analyzing Pandemic Influenza Spread (MASSAPIS), which is capable of modeling
individual social behaviors in the context of an outbreak of pandemic influenza for the pur-
pose of policy analysis. The model has been built to investigate the spread of pandemic
influenza A(H1N1) virus1 in the U.S. population simulated using a synthetic population
of 281 million individual agents. The framework can be used by decision-makers to sim-
ulate different outbreak scenarios to examine how the factors impact the disease spread
dynamics. For example it can be used to model how factors such varying levels of disease
severity (measured by varying the basic infectiousness rate, R0), population size, demog-
raphy, and interventions to contain the disease (vaccination and social distancing/school
closures) impact the spread of the disease in the population.
MASSAPIS extends Parker and Epstein’s GSAM framework [219] by (i) endowing agents
with two psychological constructs—attitude and resolution, to capture how agents’ attitudi-
nal preferences and response to information about the risk of infection during the outbreak
affect disease spread; (ii) implementing three new additional protective features to represent
behavioral responses in the framework (vaccination, social distancing, and school closure);
and (iii) enhancing the graphical user interface with new menu options and features to
provide more functionality for MASSAPIS.
MASSAPIS is a multi-threaded stand-alone application written in the JAVA program-
ming language2 to be run on a 64-bit processor computer with at least 16 Gigabytes of
Random Access Memory (RAM). The model is controlled using a Graphical User Interface
1Sometimes abbreviated as pH1N1 or the Swine Flu virus.
2Last implemented on Java version “1.8.0 65.” Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.8.0 65-b17).
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Figure 3: A screenshot of MASSAPIS application GUI in operation. The map showing
the spatial spread of the disease is in the upper left-hand corner. The dashboard showing
run-time statistics is in the upper right-hand corner while the charts showing the number
of agents currently sick with the disease and the total infected are in the bottom half.
(GUI) shown in Figure 3.
The descriptions in this chapter include the structure of the framework and some es-
sential components and functionalities that constitute the system. The focus here is more
on providing a description of the model. Although the model is built on the U.S. popula-
tion, it may be generalized for other synthetic populations in the future. The results of the
simulation will be described in Chapter 5.
4.1 Framework Architecture
The system architecture of MASSAPIS is depicted conceptually in Figure 4. The key
software modules that constitute the GSAM on which MASSAPIS is built are included in
this diagram for completeness (shown in the gray area).
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Figure 4: The system architecture of MASSAPIS showing the major software modules of
the framework. The modules that constitute the GSAM are shown in the shaded area while
the extension modules are shown outside of the shaded box. At the start of the simulation,
all agents are susceptible to the disease. Depending on the mode at which the framework
is operated, the model can be simulated in a configuration where agents in the model are
either uninformed, become progressively informed (as the simulation proceeds), or fully
informed (as at the start of the simulation) about the protective health measures to take to
prevent the infection. When uninformed, the model simulates like the base model on which
it is built (GSAM model), and when informed, the model simulates as MASSAPIS using
the extended features.
4.1.1 Conceptual Model
A conceptual mapping of MASSAPIS is shown in Figure 5. It is made up of the core behav-
ior module which represents software components that determine how the system operates
(as GSAM or MASSAPIS) and thus exhibit its preventive behaviors, the agent itinerary
behavior module which encapsulates social distancing and school closure methods, the pop-
ulation generator module that generates the synthetic population used for the simulation,
the event recorder module which tracks all the disease events for proper house-keeping, and
the visualization module which generates the simulation results graphically. Description of
the modules are given below.
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Figure 5: A conceptual diagram of MASSAPIS showing the key functional software mod-
ules. Central to the framework is the mode of operation (Information Mode) in which
the model is simulated. The model can be simulated in three modes—No Information,
Voluntary Information, and Constant Information — which determine model results. Infor-
mation transmission and vaccination are only available when the model is run in either the
Voluntary or Constant Information modes (functioning as MASSAPIS), while the model
functions as the underlying GSAM model when operated in the No Information model.
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4.1.1.1 Core Behavior Module
The core components representing the system behavior are logically grouped here for ease
of understanding. The components are responsible for the following processes: disease
transmission, information transmission, vaccination, and the information mode (i.e., the
mode of operation) for the framework. The components are described below.
Disease Transmission Process
The same disease transmission process used in GSAM is incorporated into MASSAPIS.
For ease of understanding, the disease model may be imagined as emulating the typical
deterministic susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model [153, 10]. A schematic depiction
is shown in Figure 6.
Diffusion of the disease is simulated by changing the infection status of every individual
agent over the simulation time according to preset probabilities. The progression of the
infection is governed by the natural history of the disease. The natural history of a disease
(sometimes called the disease states) refers to the progression of a disease in an individual
over time in the absence of treatment—that is, from its pathological onset to manifestation
of the disease in the host individual to its eventual resolution (complete recovery or death)
[46]. In this case, infected agents recover from the disease after progression and become
immune to it and are thus removed from the population (recovered state). Vaccination is
also implemented where application of it changes the disease state of agents from susceptible
to recovered.
Six disease states are identified and modeled in the GSAM framework to represent the
disease transmission process for pandemic influenza A/H1N1. The disease states are:
• the susceptible state,
• the infected state which consists of four states that are not necessarily sequential
(Noncontagious-Asymptomatic, Noncontagious-Symptomatic, Contagious-Asymptomatic,
and Contagious-Symptomatic states), and
• the recovered state.
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Figure 6: A schematic representation of a typical S − I − R model. All members of the
population are initially susceptible (color coded as black). Then on the onset of infection,
some get infected and move to the infected state (color coded as red). Over time, infected
agents transition to the recovered class and are removed from the population for disease
transmission purposes (color coded as blue).
The four infected states are defined as follows:
1. NonContagious-Asymptomatic: Here infected agents are not yet able to transmit the
pathogen (noncontagious) and also do not show the symptoms (asymptomatic). This
means infected agents cannot yet infect or affect other susceptible agents in any way
during contact. The agent can thus be considered as ‘inactive3’ in the model just like
other susceptible agents. These agents cannot yet influence the epidemic results. This
useful feature is used to reduce some of the computational overhead during simulation.
2. NonContagious-Symptomatic: In this state, agents are infected but not yet able to
spread the pathogen. However, they show the disease symptoms. This means that
although they cannot yet spread the disease, they are still able to affect others because
they show the symptoms. When other susceptible agents see these symptoms they
may be influenced to take precautionary steps such as limiting contact to minimize
their own risk of exposure to the disease.
3. Contagious-Asymptomatic: Agents in this state are able to spread the virus (conta-
gious) but do not show the visible symptoms (asymptomatic). Thus they are ‘silent
3Agents are considered active if they are either contagious or symptomatic or both because they can
infect or affect the behavior of other agents.
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spreaders’ because they do not signal to others (susceptible agents) their true state
yet they can infect them on contact.
4. Contagious-Symptomatic: This is the state where agents spread the virus and also
show the symptoms of the disease. Susceptible agents are able to take appropriate
precautionary action because they can ‘see’ the true state of the infected agent around
them and can take steps to avoid them if necessary.
To better understand the infected states, it is helpful to mention here that in general,
the progression of an infection through a human host can take two paths or timelines
differentiated by the ordering of their latent and incubation time periods [10]. When a
host gets infected, the host does not immediately show the symptoms or transmit the
pathogen—this is done over a period of time dependent largely on the host biology. The
time it takes for the host to show the disease symptoms is called the incubation period
(asymptomatic state) and the time it takes to become contagious is called the latent period
(nonContagious state). The intensity of the infection is governed by its basic reproduction
number, R0 (defined in the next section).
The challenge is that there is no specific ordering of these paths. Either can occur before
the other depending on factors such as how the pathogen interacts with the host’s biology,
presence of pre-existing pharmaceutical interventions, and so forth. The infected host may
show symptoms (symptomatic state) before actually becoming contagious (contagious state)
and able to infect others, or the host may become contagious first, infecting others well
before showing the symptoms. On average, agents in the population get contagious about
2.1 days after infection or symptomatic about 1.9 days after infection. Infected agents
transition through the infected states in about 4.1 days on average after which they recover.
These numbers closely approximate the values others used for similar simulations. For
example, the studies led by Ferguson [100] and Longini [181] show similar results. The
actual details of how agents in the model transition through these six disease states has
already been discussed in Parker and Epstein’s work [219], thus it is not repeated here.
At the start of the simulation, all agents are set in the susceptible state. The disease
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is then initialized by randomly infecting a select number of agents to start the infection
process. This represents a scenario where the pandemic influenza virus ‘reaches’ the U.S.
population facilitated by some external agency like air travel [278, 88]. I randomly selected
40 agents in the location with the highest population density (in California) and infected
them with the disease to start off this process. This number of agents is close to what
others used to initialize their model. For example, the Ferguson/Burke model of pandemic
influenza spread in SouthEast Asia seeded 12 agents with an infection [100]. This number of
agents to infect can be varied from the Other Settings menu in the application GUI toolbar
(shown in Figure 10).
Finally, agents transition to the recovered state either of two ways—(i) after passing
through the illness (i.e., infected states) and recovering from it, or (ii) by avoiding the
illness completely if they receive the vaccine that provides them with immunity (i.e., a
direct transition from the susceptible to the recovered state). The simulation ends either
due to herd immunity when at least 36.6% of the population has been infected or when the
number of infected agents in the population falls to 5.
Basic Reproductive Number (R0)
The severity or transmissibility (sometimes referred to also as the attack rate) of an infec-
tious disease is determined by its basic reproductive number (R0). This is defined as the
average number of secondary cases generated by a primary infectious case in an entirely
susceptible population [10]. A disease can spread widely if R0 > 1, but inevitably dies out if
R0 < 1. Obviously, the disease can be contained if we can control its reproductive number.
However, this ability is out of our hands and out of the scope of this research.
Transmissibility of the influenza virus depends on a number of factors such as suscepti-
bility of the population, geography, population density, and even demographic factors which
are difficult to incorporate into models. Thus, R0 varies considerably among studies and
pandemics [279, 12, 200, 199]. Lower reproductive numbers are typically used for seasonal
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influenza epidemics4 while higher numbers are used for pandemics5. For example, Longini
et al. [179] suggest a moderately severe epidemic as one with R0 < 1.6. Colizza et al. [64]
suggest a nearly severe epidemic as one with R0 < 1.9 and a very severe epidemic perceived
as one with R0 ≥ 2.3. For the Spanish Flu (considered to be most severe influenza pan-
demic in modern history)—Chowell and colleagues estimated the reproductive number to
be somewhere between 1.49 − 3.75 [61]. The general suggestion from the literature is that
the average basic reproductive number for the 2009 Swine Flu lies somewhere close to 2.
This number can be set in MASSAPIS incrementally in steps of 0.2 between a range of 1 -
4 from the Infectiousness menu in the application toolbar as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: A screenshot of the application interface showing how to set the basic reproductive
number for the simulation.
Other assumptions for the configuration include:
• Constant disease attack rate for both adults and children.
• 67% of infected agents develop influenza symptoms and 33% will be asymptomatic
4Note that the 2009 Swine Flu virus has not been totally wiped out yet from the human population. It is
still present with us today but circulates in very low numbers with R0 somewhere close to 1. It is one of the
viruses that currently cause the seasonal flu, which may become an epidemic when R0 ≥ 1. It is noteworthy
that when modeling at lower reproductive numbers, most epidemics seeded by a single individual generally
go extinct by chance before becoming established in the population [100].
5In addition to using the reproductive number to make a distinction between an epidemic and a pandemic
disease, it is often the origin of the virus that is an important factor. Typically, an emergent virus that
causes a pandemic is of novel origin, as is the case with the 2009 Swine Flu. Often it is the antigenic drift
that causes its emergence, which may or may not lead to a pandemic outbreak in the human population
[112, 209, 303].
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(similar to assumptions by others [181, 125]).
• Transmission is assumed to occur as follows - 30% in households, 37% in schools and
workplaces, and 33% in the wider community. These are common mixing areas and
parameters used in these kinds of studies [179, 181, 125, 100].
• Community transmission is considered to be a result of random mixing and modeled
as localized random mixing with the risk of transmission determined by a power-law
function as is typically the case in these studies.
• Weekend, seasonal, and other disease effects6 are ignored.
Vaccination & Vaccine Effectiveness
Vaccination is a cornerstone and an effective preventive measure for limiting the spread of
pandemic influenza [100, 101, 181], but its benefits are dependent on the disease dynamics7,
vaccine effectiveness, deployment time, vaccine supply, and uptake in the population [272,
19]. Since the GSAM lacked this capability, I built modules into the framework to implement
a vaccination scheme in the population as part of my extension.
For this study, I employed a simple one-stage single-dose vaccination strategy based on
the assumption that the vaccine is homologous-matched to the virus i.e., a single dose of
the vaccine is applied to qualified susceptible agents on one specific day during the entire
simulation. The homologous-matching aspect implies that the vaccine matches the genetic
strain of circulating virus and is antigenically stable i.e., with no sign of genetic drift8
[112]. Other studies have implemented a targeted vaccinated strategy where individuals or
groups at higher risk of infection, for example, the elderly (over 65 year olds) and school-
aged children (under 12 year olds) in the population are prioritized and vaccinated first
[93, 125, 256].
6In reality, a spectrum of disease severity occurs during a pandemic. Neglecting all of these effects helps
simplify modeling efforts.
7The disease dynamics includes among other factors multiple introduction of the disease into the com-
munity, disease viral strain type, and unpredictable host-disease interaction.
8Annual influenza epidemics occur partially due to strains of influenza genetically drifting from year to
year. So vaccines are produced targeting the strains that are predicted to circulate before the coming season.
However, a major antigenic shift can occur suddenly resulting in a pandemic [42].
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For computability reasons, I assumed the single dose will provide the needed protection
immediately when it is received and will provide immunity for the duration of the simulation.
In reality, determining the number of doses and the duration of protection provided can be
challenging because vaccination is typically provided to the population over an extended
period time often in more than one dose. Also, immunity typically builds over time and
can vary from person to person [42, 272]. For example, Fergusson et al. [101] assumed a
single dose vaccine gave protection for two weeks and reduced susceptibility by about 70%
in their model. Yang et al. [303] assumed two doses of the vaccine would be needed with at
least three between the first and second doses in their study. However, they suggested that
one dose could be sufficient for people over nine years old. Khazeni et al. [157] assumed
that their vaccine would provide complete immunity to 75% of recipients fourteen days
after vaccination. The wide variation in the effectiveness and dosage assumptions makes
comparison with other models challenging and complicates model validation.
Modeling the effectiveness of the vaccine is also challenging since it is based on complex
interactions of the vaccine with the host biology, since in actuality, some of those individuals
that were vaccinated still remain susceptible to the disease. Researchers typically use an
efficiency factor in the range of 60% - 100% in modeling studies [298, 275]. For MASSAPIS,
I used a vaccine efficiency factor of 60% for adults and 70% for children in the population.
This vaccination feature can be set from the Other Settings menu in the application interface
as shown in Figure 8. I assumed that the vaccine would be more effective in adults than
children because It has been shown that the biology of the adults in the population would
be able to hold the vaccine agent in their bodies better than the children who often need
multiple doses to maintain their immunity (since I used a single-dose approach).
Prosser et al. [230] calculated the cost-effectiveness of the 2009 pandemic influenza vac-
cination program in the U.S. (predicting the costs and health outcomes using inactivated
vaccine compared to no vaccination) and found, among other things, that vaccination for
children and working-age adults during the outbreak was cost-effective compared to other
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preventive health interventions but that the delays in vaccine availability substantially im-
pacted the cost-effectiveness of the vaccination program. In summary, vaccination is a cost-
effective intervention but the associated delays (for drug development and deployment) is
inevitable and impacts health outcomes.
In practice, vaccine deployment initially suffers from development delays and limited
production capacity [256]. Currently, I vaccinated just 30 million agents representing about
10% of the agent population a month after the first outbreak of the virus to mimic this
limited vaccine availability and delay issues. Vaccination uptake observed during the 2009
outbreak was similarly low [27]. The reasons for this is beyond the scope of this work,
however some of the reasons typically adduced include delays in the drug discovery and
deployment [230, 303, 272] and people’s attitude towards vaccination [172]. The general
suggestion amongst epidemiological researchers is to vaccinate somewhere in the range of
10% - 90% of the population [220].
Figure 8: Vaccination menu from the application toolbar showing the options for how to:
(i) set the number to vaccinate, (ii) the day to start the vaccination program, and (iii) the
vaccine efficiency.
Information Transmission Process
Much of the conceptual framework which are use for understanding the diffusion of informa-
tion in networks originates from the diffusion of innovation studies [237]. Contagion (disease
or information) spreads from active (infected or influenced) to inactive (uninfected or un-
influenced) nodes (or agents) through in a network or population through some amount of
contact. A rich set of models have been developed to examine different contagion mecha-
nisms in different networks [57, 66, 171, 118, 236, 123, 208], but relevant to this study is the
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generalization that information reaches a person in a network in two ways—through connec-
tions in one’s social networks (implicit) and through external influences (exogenous) from
out-of-network sources like mainstream media [208]. The effects of the external influences
are often unobservable and difficult to measure.
In this thesis, I define information contagion as a health advisory or recommendation
disseminated by the government agency responsible for coordinating the mitigation and
control efforts during a pandemic influenza outbreak. This agency is considered to be the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in this case. I assume the information is
disseminated through a range of media channels (for example, social media and mass media)
constituting an individual’s implicit and explicit networks.The importance of the mass me-
dia as the chief medium of information propagation is a good approximation here because
information about pandemics are major national headline topics of discussion during an
outbreak. Even healthworkers are tuned in to the mass media for directives in some cases.
For example, Torun and colleagues [270] revealed that the media was the only source of
information about pandemic influenza in nearly a third of healthcare workers they surveyed
in a public hospital in Istanbul, Turkey, during the 2009 influenza outbreak.
While different advisory information is typically disseminated during a pandemic, I focus
on the information type that encourages protective measures such as vaccination and social
distancing. An example of this is quoted here:
“Vaccines to protect against 2009 H1N1 are widely available. CDC is en-
couraging everyone to get vaccinated against 2009 H1N1. Those who have been
patiently waiting to receive the 2009 H1N1 vaccine are now encouraged to get
vaccinated. Due to early availability of, and high demand for, seasonal flu vac-
cine, remaining supplies of seasonal vaccine are limited. CDC continues to en-
courage those at highest risk from flu complications to seek seasonal flu vaccine
and receive 2009 H1N1 vaccine, as recommended.” – [53]
Because information diffuses alongside the disease in a complex way, it is difficult to fully
represent the process in a behavior-disease model [89, 109, 98, 107]. Particularly in this age
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of social media where we are increasingly interconnected with each other in intricate ways
[60, 51]. In MASSAPIS, I conceived three modes of operation to govern how information
diffuses in the model—the No Information, Voluntary Information, and Constant Informa-
tion modes. In the No Information mode, no advisory information about the disease is
disseminated and so agents are not enabled to respond with protective behaviors. Only the
disease contagion circulates in the population, so the model simply functions as the GSAM
base model. In the Voluntary Information mode, advisory information is disseminated in
the system and diffuses like a contagion in the population over the simulation time. How-
ever, only those agents that are informed are enabled to respond to it. In the Constant
Information mode, all agents in the model are informed at the start of the simulation and
can thus respond to it right from the start of the simulation. The assumption in this case
is that since pandemics typically emerges outside the U.S., the CDC and media would have
had enough time to inform the entire population. As such, it can be assumed that every
individual in the population would have already heard about it before the infection reaches
the U.S. This is the mode used for two of the models tested in this experiment. The mode
is selected from menu toolbar in the application GUI as shown in Figure 9 during model
configuration.
Figure 9: A screenshot of the application GUI showing how to set the Information Mode
(i.e., mode of operation) for the system during model configuration.
The diffusion of information in the framework is modeled using a simple diffusion process.
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At the start of the simulation, 100 uninformed agents are arbitrarily selected for infection
with the information contagion to act as the initial spreaders in the population. The ac-
tual transmission process occurs either of two ways: (i) agent-to-agent contact made when
two agents meet (implicit sources), and (ii) by randomly selecting an agent for infection
to emulate an out-of-network ‘media contact’ (exogenous sources). For the agent-to-agent
transmission, I assume an infection transmissibility probability of 20% as the effective conta-
gion rate and a probability of 40% for the exogenous contact. The transmission probabilities
though arbitrary, are below that suggested by Myers et al. for information diffusion in a
network [208]. The parameters can be set and varied for analysis from the Other Settings
menu in the application GUI toolbar as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Other Settings menu items in the application toolbar.
4.1.1.2 Agent Itinerary Behavior Generator
The agent itinerary behavior generator is part of the GSAM module and adopted into MAS-
SAPIS. It defines how agents move about their various social networks. The social networks
are social groups that individual agents interact with as they go about their daily itinerary
over the course of the simulation. Three contact groups are defined in the model consis-
tent with typical assumptions—family, coworker/classmate, and random contact networks
[101, 181, 178, 100]. For example, agents that belong to the same household are classified
as being in the same family contact group.
Agent to agent contact is based on a probability of occurrence determined by the agents
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itinerary pre-defined by the model designer. This probability is generated using a simple and
efficient non-homogenous poisson process9 to generate the time of the day (and hence the
probability) at which the contacts will occur. This is an approach used by others in similar
fast spreading disease scenarios [25]. The specific probability distribution implemented is
depicted in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Diagram of the contact probabilities (referred to as behavior stream by Parker
and Epstein [219]) for agents in the three contact groups embedded in the GSAM. This
probability was generated by a non-homogenous poisson process. Observe that the proba-
bility of contact increases during the day time (around 9 to 5 PM) for work contacts and
reduces for family contact as can be expected while the reverse is true in the evening time.
Image source: [219].
Social Distancing & School Closures
Social distancing and school closure features are not implemented in GSAM and are part of
the features I implemented in MASSAPIS. As previously described, social distancing and
school closures form part of the recommended nonpharmaceutical intervention strategies
for limiting the spread of pandemic influenza [101, 100, 181].
I implemented the social distancing scheme in this study by further limiting the con-
tact probability of agents behavior streams. So for example, suppose an agent has a 60%
probability of making contact with another agent in its social network, if the social distance
9A non-homogenous poisson process is suitable for modeling applications that generate random points
in time [122]. For example, generating a probability for the number of people arriving at a specific location
over time.
48
feature is activated and set to limit contact by 25%, then the updated contact probability
will be 0.60(1− 0.25) = 0.45. The following limits are default values set in the framework:
25%, 50%, and 75%. For school closure, I implemented a scheme that prevents children-
to-children contact when the school closure feature is activated. This simply checks the
identity of agents during the contact and avoids contact when agents are school-aged and
the school closure is turned on. Both features are configurable from the application GUI as
shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Snapshot of the application GUI showing how to set the social distance and
school closure parameters during model configuration.
4.1.1.3 Population Generator
The population generator module is part of the underlying modules from the GSAM in-
corporated into MASSAPIS. The module generates the synthetic agents used to create the
population simulated in the model, in this case, the U.S. population, based on a pre-defined
dataset.
The population structure utilized is sized for the continental U.S. mapped to the Census
Bureau data. Individual agents are approximately co-located in households constructed to
reflect typical generational structure (for age and size). Households are randomly distributed
with a local density determined by the LandScan population dataset10 [163].
The dataset is a 43,200 by 20,880 grid of estimated population and agents are distributed
onto the grid based on longitude, latitude, and zip code to approximate individuals co-
located in households, schools, and workplaces. Demographically, agents are classified by
age—as either adults (defined as individuals 18 years of age or over) or children (defined
10The LandScan dataset produced by Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) is a global population distribution
dataset considered by many as one of the finest population data available. It is a model of instantaneous
population density rather than population density and has a 1 km (30 in by 30 in) resolution.
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as individuals under 18 years of age) and placed in households in line with the 2010 census
data. As part of the enhancement to the base model, I added additional demographic
markers for each of the agent in MASSAPIS: attitude, resolution, information status, and
vaccination status.
The dataset consists of a population of 281.4 million agents. 74.4% are marked as adults
and 25.6% are children. An average of 2.42 people are expected in households. These
numbers are close to the latest Vintage11 population estimates released by the Census
Bureau (for 2014, 77% are age 18 or over and 23% are under 18 [274]). All households have
a household ‘head’ that influence certain ‘decisions’ made by the children in the households.
For example, if the head of the household is against vaccination, the children will also follow
after this decision.
For computational efficiency reasons, the total population is partitioned into smaller
more ‘manageable’ grids or ModelBlocks (MB) that aggregates agents that live in the same
vicinity. For example, agents in the same zip code, city block, or square-kilometer area can
be grouped together in the same ModelBlock. 27,500 ModelBlocks12 (defined as 20 km-by-
20 km grids) are contained in this platform. Therefore agents in the same ModelBlocks are
more likely to interact with agents in their own ModelBlock reducing the communication
burden and improving performance because the simulation can now run ModelBlock by
ModelBlock instead of simulating the entire population at once. Agents in each ModelBlock
are further partioned into smaller groups called AgentGroups to further ease computation.
An AgentGroup contains about 1,800 agents when the full population size is simulated
and about 900 agents when the population size simulated is reduced by half. Figure 13
shows a schematic outline of this population breakdown. Agents are identified as belonging
to a specific AgentGroup in a particular ModelBlock and tracked (for communication and
infection purposes) for the duration of the simulation. The population size can be scaled
(i.e., reduced) as desired for computational efficiency purposes. The scale value can be set
11Vintage population estimates are revisions to the census estimates and are released by the U.S. Census
Bureau each year. In this case, post-2010 estimates.
12MASSAPIS software application requires a computer with at least 8-core processors. The ModelBlocks
are distributed between the 8 cores for multithreading.
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from the Other Settings menu in the application GUI as shown in Figure 14 during model
configuration.
Figure 13: Schematic representation of how the agent population is partitioned into smaller
groups called AgentGroups for computational efficiency reasons. The model is actually
simulated sequentially AgentGroup-by-AgentGroup in the system.
Figure 14: Screenshot of the application GUI showing how to set the population size from
the menu toolbar.
4.1.1.4 Event Recorder
The event recorder module is part of the GSAM framework incorporated into MASSAPIS.
It consists of components that record and track all the communication and disease state
events of the agents during the simulation. For example, events like tracking the run time,
agents’ disease statuses, and their contact list during the simulation. The implementation
details of this module can be found in Parker and Epstein [219].
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4.1.1.5 Visualization
The visualization module constitute all the components that make up the application graph-
ical user interface (GUI). The application itself and the GUI front-end part are both built
in Java as a stand-alone multithreaded application. I extended the original user interface
to incorporate the additional features provided by MASSAPIS. The added features to the
interface include an enriched menu toolbar used to configure some of the model parameters
and a dashboard for displaying some of the model configuration parameters and results.
The interface also displays the disease states of agents in the model superimposed on a
map of the continental U.S. and two charts (the number of agents currently sick and the
total number infected) for tracking the impact of the disease in the population. A screenshot
of the application GUI is shown in Figure 3.
As the disease progresses through the population, the color of the map tracking the
disease states (located in the top left-hand corner of Figure 3) changes to reflect the intensity
of the infection. The color of the map changes from black (signifying susceptible agents),
to red (infected agents), to blue (recovered agents). This visual depiction allows users of
the system to see the progression of the disease in the population for quick policy insights.






Figure 15: Map showing the progression of the disease in the population at: (a) the start
of the simulation; (b) around day 120 of the simulation run; (c) around the peak time
of infection; and at (d) the end of the simulation. The black color represents susceptible
agents, red represents the infected agents, and blue represents agents that have recovered
from the disease.
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4.1.2 Spontaneous Behavior Capability Features
The distinctive feature of MASSAPIS is its implementation of preventive behaviors in re-
sponse to the perceived threat of infection during an outbreak of pandemic influenza in a
population. Note that I use the term ‘behavior’ (or ‘preventive behavior’) differently than
Parker and Epstein [219]. In the GSAM, the term behavior or behaviorstream is used to
refer to the way the agents go about their daily itinerary within their social circles (see
Figure 11). Essentially, a probability distribution of agent-to-agent contact in the three
social circles defined in the model. Here, I use the term behavior to mean the attitudes,
resolutions, and actions agents take in response to advisory information about the disease
disseminated by the CDC (vaccination and social distancing). However, the term is loosely
used in the literature to encompass different actions surrounding an intervention as well as
the intervention agent itself. For instance, vaccination uptake is sometimes called “vacci-
nation behavior” without considering the choices leading to the action [203, 244]. At other
times, it includes the actions as well as the drug use [143]. I used the term in this latter
sense mostly, but sometimes I also used it to apply just to the intervention agent.
The attitude and resolution attributes are conceived as a two-stage decision-making
process used by informed agents to determine their course of action (see the framework
diagram in Figure 4). The attitude is conceived like an intention to take an action, while
the resolution represents the finalized intent. I used this approach to mimic the intention-
behavior gap that is noticed between intentions and ultimate behavior [102, 7, 8, 261,
255, 137]. Expressed simply, an individual may possess an intention (or as in this case
an attitude) towards a health behavior, but may end up not taking the action or fully
carry it out to its logical conclusion. For example, Bish et al. [26] noted that a differential
existed between intention and vaccination uptake during the 2009 outbreak. That is, not all
individuals that declared an intention to take the vaccine went ahead with the commitment.
In the next section, I briefly describe how attitudes and resolutions work together to
produce the behavioral changes modeled in this thesis. Note that these features are activated




All agents in the model are endowed with an attitude attribute to capture their psychological
preferences or ‘intentions’ towards the recommended preventive measures aimed at limiting
infection. I modeled three broad categories—positive, negative, and neutral attitudes —
similar to the three categories used by Mao [185] and Ormen et al. [215]. Agents with
a positive attitude represent individuals in the population inclined to believe the health
recommendation issued by the government advising them to adopt protective measures,
topmost of which is vaccination. Agents with negative attitudes represent those inclined
not to believe the information, while agents with neutral attitudes represent individuals
who are undecided or ambivalent about the recommendations.
When agents make contact or acquire the information, they ‘react’ to it immediately
(i.e, spontaneously) to form resolutions or the course of action to take. Here, three resolu-
tion attributes are modeled: The resolution to trust, not trust, or be skeptical about the
information. The resolution process is depicted in Figure 16 for more clarity.
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Figure 16: Schematic representation of agents attitudes interacting with information to
form their corresponding resolutions.
Estimating the attitude parameters is nontrivial since it is a complex psychological
variable and beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the sake of simplicity, I assumed the
attitudes remain unchanged once formed by agents in this experiment. In reality, attitudes
are non-static variables and evolve over time as an individual’s knowledge and preferences
change.
Studies examining vaccine uptake during the 2009 outbreak suggest that vaccine uptake
was low and people largely did not trust the vaccine [27, 270, 29]. Consequently, I assumed
a large percentage of the current population had a largely negative attitude towards the
recommendation. I estimated this number to be about 60% of the population, and I assigned
the other parameters as thus: positive attitude – 25% and neutral attitude – 15%. In reality,
empirically determining estimating these parameters is fraught due to a lack of reliable data.
For the households with children in the population, I assigned the children the same
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attitude as the head of their household so that they make the same ‘choices’ as the head
of the household. So for example, if the head of the household had a positive attitude, the
children present in the household will also be assigned positive attitudes. This is because
parents to a large extent influence the vaccination uptake record of their children as observed
during the 2009 outbreak [270, 215, 304, 27, 30]. The attitude parameters can be set from
the application GUI as shown in Figure 17.
Figure 17: Screenshot of the application GUI showing how to set agents’ attitude parame-
ters.
Setting Agents’ Resolutions
As previously highlighted, the resolution acts as the final intent of agents. It adds variation
to an agent’s attitude or first intention such that in some cases the final intention may be
different from the initial one. For this experiment, three resolutions are assumed following
from the three attitudes.
The resolutions are determined according to these rules:
• All agents that have positive attitudes when informed have a resolution of Trust. They
trust the information and are inclined to accept the protective measures.
• Agents with negative attitudes when informed are randomly assigned to either of these
two resolutions—Not Trust or be Skeptical. This assignment is done to capture the
idea that not all agents with negative attitudes reject the recommendations. Some
are skeptical but in the long run accept the recommendations even though they lack
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conviction the recommendations are true. This duality was noticed during the 2009
outbreak [215, 27], and is represented in MASSAPIS using simple probabilities. In
essence, agents that have a resolution of Not Trust are opposed to the vaccine while
those that are Skeptical may accept or reject it.
• Agents that have a neutral attitude are undecided and are randomly assigned any
of the three resolutions. As observed during the 2009 outbreak [270, 304, 27], some
people did not outright accept or reject the idea, but maintained a ‘middle ground’
on the issue. They thus could be swayed to any of the three resolutions. Currently, I
assigned such agents resolutions according to the following probabilities: Trust - 33%,
Not Trust - 33%, and Skeptical - 34%.
Setting Agents’ Vaccination Behavior
Three vaccination preferences are modeled in this work to represent individuals who are:
inclined, opposed, or indifferent to the vaccine. Generally, those inclined receive the vaccine,
those opposed reject it, and those indifferent may or may not accept it. Technically, the
vaccination preferences are just the result of the resolutions but have the added feature of
some variation added to it.
I configured the preferences thusly:
• Agents that have a resolution of Trust are all inclined to the vaccine and will accept
it at the appointed time.
• Agents that have a Not Trust resolution have some variability added to their outcome
because they are randomly assigned the following preferences— 80% are set to oppose
the vaccine and 20% set to be indifferent to it. I used this variability to reflect
the notion that a small percentage of those who do not really trust may relax their
preference (for some undisclosed reasons) and accept the vaccine. This possibility
to make that transition is offered by setting some small percentage of the agents as
indifferent.
• Agents that are Skeptical are randomly assigned the following preferences—20% are
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inclined, 40% are indifferent, and the remaining 40% opposed. The idea behind this
is to reflect some of the variation in decisions that skeptical people manifest towards
the vaccine [304].
Agents with an ‘inclined’ preference will always accept the vaccine, agents that are
opposed will always reject the vaccine, and those indifferent may or may not accept the
vaccine. The vaccine confers immunity and permanently removes agents from the infected
class to the recovered class.
Varying Agents’ Contact Behavior
In addition to implementing different vaccination behaviors, I also implemented a scheme
to allow the informed agents to vary how they make contact with other agents as a means of
limiting contact based on their resolutions. This is to enable informed agents to take steps
to limit contact with other agents with a view towards influencing their infection profiles.
This is a form of social distancing based on agents’ resolutions. I formulated the following
rules to implement the actions:
• For agents with a resolution of Trust, I limited their contact rate by 50%. This is
because I assume that agents that trust the information will take preventive steps to
reduce contact. I arbitrarily assumed this reduction in contact rate.
• For agents with a resolution of Not Trust, I arbitrarily increased their contact rate by
25%. I used this to emulate the notion that individuals that do not trust a recom-
mendation will tend to take on more risk than usual. Thus, increasing their contact
rate will increase their chances of getting infected thereby making them more prone
to infection.
• For agents with a Skeptical resolution, I implemented a scheme that combines actions
from the two previous steps. I configured 50% of the agents to limit their contact
rate by 50%, 25% of the agents to increase contact by 25%, and the remaining 25% to
maintain their current preset contact rates. Since skeptical agents are undecided, on
a course of preventive action, I assumed that some of them may take the preventive
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action, some may reject it and be more inclined to take risks that will expose them
to more infections, and some will remain undecided taking no actions at all that will
either decrease or increase their risk profile. Due to the difficulty of approximating
these parameters in the real world, I used arbitrary percentages for ease of simulation.
4.2 Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the computational framework I developed called MASSAPIS,
an exploratory tool designed for decision-makers to explore how certain spontaneous hu-
man behaviors impact the spread of pandemic influenza in the U.S. population for policy
intervention purposes during an outbreak. MASSAPIS is an extension to the GSAM, thus
inherits a significant part of GSAM’s software code base. I presented the methodological
approach that I employed to develop the framework, discussed its key components using
a conceptual model, and highlighted its spontaneous behavior capability features. It is
noteworthy that estimating the model parameters is fraught with difficulty due to a lack
of sufficient data and studies to ground assumptions. Thus many assumptions are made to
ensure computational feasibility and maintain parsimony. This is one of the perennial chal-
lenges encountered in modeling human behavioral responses and large networks [89, 98, 107].
Importantly, although MASSAPIS is currently configured for the U.S. population, it can
be re-configured and applied to other populations for similar analyses.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS, VALIDATION, & DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I present the simulation results obtained from the models tested, the vali-
dation approach employed, and the implications of the results for policy insights.
I tested four models in this thesis—baseline, baseline with social distancing, largely
negative attitude, and largely positive attitude models. The baseline model represents
the case where the disease progresses in the population without any form of intervention
(vaccination and social distancing), essentially, operating as the underlying GSAM model;
the baseline with social distancing model approximates a population where individuals limit
disease progression by social distancing alone without any drug intervention; the largely
negative attitude model is configured to represent a population where individuals are largely
hesitant of government-inspired preventive measures; and the largely positive attitude model
represents a population where individuals are largely receptive of the measures. I simulated
these four models using six scenarios of disease transmissibility to obtain results that span
a range of low to severe disease infectiousness. I created the scenarios by varying the
basic reproductive number R0 as is typically done in these kinds of spatiotemporal studies
[179, 114, 125, 101]. I varied R0 in the range of 1.6 — 4.0.
Two main sets of results per scenario are obtained from each simulation—the Number
Currently Sick (or current incidence) and the Total Infected (or disease burden). The num-
ber currently sick is defined as the number of symptomatic cases of the infection that occur
daily while the total infected is the cumulative sum of the number of agents infected with
the disease. Both measurements are recorded at each simulation time step and displayed
graphically in the application GUI as shown in Figure 3.
It should be noted that the results reported are hypothetical scenarios and not ‘predic-
tions.’ Scenarios are simply conceptualization of what could happen if certain conditions
hold (i.e., based on what we know about the state of the system), while predictions are like
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best guesses of what will actually happen given the conditions. This distinction is germane
to avoid misinterpretation as policymakers and other consumers of these kinds of research
are often interested in obtaining a ‘single-number’ estimate to use for decision-making. This
study gives contrasting scenarios within the limits of the performance of the model for more
insight into how a potent disease such as pandemic influenza A/H1N1 may spread in the
United States. Provided that the assumptions are ‘reasonable,’ the model results may be
taken as ‘truth’ but with consideration of uncertainty.
The model validation, results, and discussion of the results are presented in the following
sections.
5.1 Model Validation
Validating agent-based models like MASSAPIS1 empirically is fraught with many difficul-
ties. Two challenges standout—first, the critical issue of software verification, and sec-
ond, the many methodological challenges2 that beset the validation of agent-based models
[90, 196]. In the first case, representing the heterogeneities of agents and the complex in-
teractions that may result (i.e., the emergence of new patterns of macro-level behavior)
is difficult to verify and benchmark with other models. In the second case, the lack of
appropriate and sufficient data to parameterize the model leads to many methodological
challenges such as the making of arbitrary approximations for the sake of model simplicity
[89, 98, 107].
As a result, the concept of validating agent-based models is generally not approached
the same way as it is done in other domains. Other researchers have even suggested that
the term validation as empirically conceived is no longer adequate as agent-based models
capture many interactions not easily reflected in observed data. Instead, they suggest a
1It is should be noted that even the GSAM on which MASSAPIS is based was not validated [219, p. 4].
2Some of the other challenges include: (1) artificial societies are modeled differently by different re-
searchers thus difficult to find a common basis for comparing different models, and (2) the features of the
real societies which the agent-based models represent are subject to structural changes over time such that
even within a single generation of observation, several model adjustments and recalibrations may be needed
to maintain model fidelity. For example, the fall of the Berlin wall brought a sudden, comprehensive, and
instantaneous change to the German society within a single generation of observation. So models represent-
ing that society used before the fall of the wall for population-level insights will need to be recalibrated to
obtain ‘valid’ results after the wall came down.
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more qualitative view of validation and use the term ‘authentication’ as it reflects more of
forensic abilities and witnessing [23]. In general, validation of agent-based models is simply
done either by comparing model results with each other or comparing the model result
to some known ground truth. In reality, close connections with empiricists are needed to
help validate these models so that the empirical results obtained can be better grounded in
theory for explanatory or predictive purposes. A richer discussion on the alternatives and
prospects of empirical validation of agent-based models can be found in [23, 297, 206, 94].
To validate the models, I compared the model results with the historical data of the
disease burden as reported by the CDC. While this is a minimalist approach, it provides at
least a reference point for assessing the models based on the impact of the disease in the
population. The CDC reported that 60.8 million individuals were affected by the disease
during the outbreak (April 12, 2009 - April 10, 2010) [257]. It should be noted that while
the pandemic was contained within 12 months of the reported outbreak, the A/H1N1 virus
strain that caused the disease still remains in circulation (at low-levels) in the human
population even now and sometimes causes some of the seasonal influenzas.
5.2 Results
I created four models and tested them for six scenarios of disease transmissibility set at
R0 = 1.6, 2, 2.6, 3, 3.6 and 4. The first model called the baseline model captures the
progression of the disease through the population without any intervention. This is aimed
at revealing the dynamics of the pandemic in the absence of mitigation. The second model
called the baseline with social distancing model incorporates a social distancing scheme
where agents limit their regular pattern of contact by 50% as a preventive measure. This
is aimed at creating an alternate view for examining how social distancing alone impacts
disease spread.
The third and fourth models are the main cases of interest in this thesis. Here the
impact of agents attitudes and resolutions towards the recommended protective measures
implemented in the model are evaluated. For this experiment, the models are configured
in the Complete Information Mode so all agents are informed ab initio and can make those
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choices.
In the case of the third model, the agent population is configured such that negative
attitudes dominate the population. The attitude configuration was set as: positive - 15%,
negative - 65%, and neutral - 10%, hence is called the largely negative model. It is configured
to approximate the behavior dynamics of the current U.S. population. For the fourth model,
the agent population was configured with dominant positive attitudes geared towards the
dynamics of a population that is more inclined to accept the health recommendations. The
attitudes were set as: positive - 75%, negative - 15%, and neutral - 10%, and is thus called
the largely positive model. 30 million agents were vaccinated on day 30 in both cases as
part of the protective scheme.
The summary results obtained from the models are recorded in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
The ‘Duration’ column shows the simulation time measured in days. The ‘Number Currently
Sick’ column captures the maximum number of agents that got sick (i.e., maximum current
incidence) during the simulation and the specific day or days it occurred. This number is
also expressed as a percentage of the total population and is recorded under the ‘%’ column.
The corresponding means and standard deviations are also recorded. The ‘Total Infected’
column captures the disease burden expressed as a sum (Total) and a percentage (%).
5.2.1 Simulation for R0 = 1.6
The key results obtained for the simulation at R0 = 1.6 are summarized in Table 2. The
plots for the Number Currently Sick (current incidence) as well as the Total Infected (disease
burden) are shown in Figure 18. Selected images showing the spread of the disease in the
population at selected time periods during the simulation is shown in Figure 19.
Table 2: Summary simulation results for R0 = 1.6
Number Currently Sick Total Infected
Duration (days) N (Max) % Day(s) occurred Mean Std. Dev. Total %
Baseline 112 72 2.62 x 10−5 8 23.99 18.41 576 20.92 x 10−5
Baseline w/sd 18 68 2.47 x 10−5 5 27.94 23.48 119 43.23 x 10−6
Negative config. 417 148 5.38 x 10−5 235 72.20 34.01 6382 23.18 x 10−4




Figure 18: Plots of (a) the Number Currently Sick, and (b) Total Infected for simulation at
R0 = 1.6. The disease profile (incidence and burden) of the models indicates that disease
has a low infectivity in the population (i.e., endemic) as only less than 6,500 agents (or
less than 1% of the population) were affected by the disease in the worst case (the negative
model). The other models had a much better performance than the negative model.
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Figure 19: Selected images showing the spread of the disease in the population for the
simulation at R0 = 1.6. The images are captured on three days—day 31, 100, and 417
to give a perspective of the spread. The black colored pixels indicate susceptible agents
and the blue color shows agents that have recovered from the disease either naturally or
by vaccination. The impact of the disease is not visible in this map since only so few got
infected. The vaccinated agents (30 million) dominate the blue color in this map since so
few got infected and recovered in the first case.
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5.2.1.1 Discussion of results for R0 = 1.6
The results obtained from this simulation shows that the disease had a low transmissibility
or severity (measured by the disease burden) in the population as just less than 1% of
the population got infected in the worst case (negative model). In comparison to the other
models, the negative model performed worse possibly because of its negative bias that causes
agents to largely reject the recommended protective measures. This bias caused the disease
to remain longer in the population in comparison to the others. This suggests that the
behavior of agents in population can allow the disease to remain longer in the population
than preferred even at low-levels of severity. The result of the positive model which captures
a more desirable population configuration, suggests that adherence to the recommendations
can help quickly contain the outbreak.
In a sense, the transmissibility of the virus in this case behaves like that of R0 6
1 for non-spatial homogenous mixing models where a disease dies out in the population
quickly. At best, infected agents may ‘clump’ together but will not be wide-spread uniformly
(common to spatial models like MASSAPIS [202]). The disease burden in all of the models
were far less than the CDC estimate (60.8 million cases).
5.2.2 Simulation for R0 = 2
The key results obtained for the simulation at R0 = 2 are summarized in Table 3. The
simulation plots are shown in Figure 20 and selected images showing the spread of the
disease at selected time steps during the simulations are shown in Figure 21.
Table 3: Summary simulation results for R0 = 2
Number Currently Sick Total Infected
Duration (days) N (Max) % Day(s) occurred Mean Std. Dev. Total %
Baseline 864 1,849,839 0.67 387 299289.63 522280.62 54,973,536 19.97
Baseline w/sd 64 90 3.27 x 10−5 19 39.43 28.16 119 20.34 x 10−5
Negative config. 661 2,790,057 1.01 278 453005.55 783012.25 63,654,365 23.12




Figure 20: Plots of (a) the Number Currently Sick, and (b) Total Infected for simulation
at R0 = 2. Note that the logarithm value is used for the plots here because of the wide
variation in result data. Two contrasting results are revealed here—the baseline and neg-
ative models exhibit epidemic characteristics (about 20% of the population affected) and
approximate the CDC estimate of 60.8 million individuals affected, while the baseline with
social distancing and positive models exhibit endemic characteristics (less than 1% of the
population affected).
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Figure 21: Selected images showing the spread of the disease in the population for simulation
at R0 = 2. The images are captured on four randomly selected days—day 60, 270, 661, and
864. The same color code adopted in the previous map is used here. The infection activity
can be seen in the baseline and negative models, unlike in the positive model. The disease
spread was faster in the negative model than the baseline but ended about 200 days before
the baseline. The positive model contained the disease in about two months.
5.2.2.1 Discussion of results for R0 = 2
Two noticeable sets of results are obtained for this scenario. First, the spread of the dis-
ease in the baseline and negative models show epidemic spread properties and both models
have a disease impact that closely approximate the CDC estimate observed during the 2009
pandemic (disease burden of 55 million and 64 million respectively compared to CDC’s 60.8
million affected). This suggests that the R0 of the outbreak using this framework is closer
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to 2 than 1.6 which is in the range of CDC’s estimate of 1.3−−2.3 [257]. This approxima-
tion thus functions like a form of ‘validation’ of the negative model, hence the framework,
albeit in a weak sense. Second, the disease was contained in both the baseline with so-
cial distance and positive models within three months of the outbreak without reaching
epidemic proportions (the peak incidence rates and disease burdens for these models were
insignificant as shown in Table 3). This suggests that the interventions adequately con-
tained the disease as desired. More so, it showed that the positive model which represents
a population more inclined to accepting protective recommendations effectively contained
the disease with minimal disease impact (less than 600 agents affected). Thus, there is a
clear incentive for the government to drive initiatives that motivate or inspire its citizens
to be positively inclined to believe government issued health recommendations.
Although the widely referenced CDC estimate used as the ground truth data for val-
idation here only measured a disease activity period of one year, April 2009 - April 2010
[257]. In essence, the CDC data only points to the fact that the epidemic period was within
this one year window of activity. In this simulation scenario, by the one year mark, the
disease burden of the negative model had practically peaked (at 61.6 million individuals
infected in comparison to CDC’s 60.8 million), while the baseline model was about half-way
(18.9 million individuals infected) to its peak value (see Figure 20b). So the results of the
negative model which is configured to the behaviors (attitudes and resolutions) of the cur-
rent modeled population fairly approximates the CDC total estimate. The baseline model
eventually achieves this close result towards the end of the simulation. At their peaks, the
illness attack rates3 for the baseline and negative models are approximately 0.7% and 1%
respectively, indicative of the seriousness of the epidemic [114].
5.2.3 Simulation for R0 = 2.6
The key results obtained for the simulation at R0 = 2.6 are summarized in Table 4. The
simulation plots are shown in Figure 22 and selected images showing the spread of the
disease at selected time steps during the simulations are shown in Figure 23.
3Defined as the number of new cases divided by the total population.
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Table 4: Summary simulation results for R0 = 2.6
Number Currently Sick Total Infected
Duration (days) N (Max) % Day(s) occurred Mean Std. Dev. N %
Baseline 375 13,217,168 4.80 162 1762087.19 3454857.36 140,461,310 51.03
Baseline w/sd 66 90 3.27 x 10−5 19 39.42 28.16 560 20.34 x 10−5
Negative config. 335 13,102,777 4.76 143 1870842.85 3471075.74 133,233,718 48.40
Positive config. 734 1,887,405 0.69 333 40346.01 543781.82 53,104,660 19.29
(a)
(b)
Figure 22: Plots of (a) the Number Currently Sick, and (b) the Total Infected for simulation
at R0 = 2.6. The disease is severe in both the baseline and negative models as shown by
the high incidence rates and disease burdens that more than doubles the CDC estimate.
71
Figure 23: Selected images showing the spread of the disease in the population for simulation
at R0 = 2.6. The images capture the spread of the disease in the population on four
randomly selected days—day 130, 335, 500, and 734. The baseline and largely negative
model have closely related patterns because they have similar illness attack rates and disease
burdens (see Table 4). However, the positive model also developed into an epidemic after
about a year (see day 335 image) out of its roughly two-year duration period. The epidemic
peaked period lasted for about three months before the disease receded in this case.
5.2.3.1 Discussion of results for R0 = 2.6
Three features are highlighted in the results from this simulation. First, the baseline and
negative models exhibit characteristics of a serious pandemic with illness attack rates of
about 5% indicative of the severity of the disease since this is more than the 1% attack
rate suggested by [114]. Also, about 50% of the total population became infected over
the course of the simulation (see Table 4). Second, the positive model which represents
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a more desirable target population (i.e., in terms of favorable attitudes and resolutions)
also reached epidemic proportions that affected almost 20% of the population over its two
year simulation period. This closely approximated the CDC estimate, so at this scenario,
the interventions provided by the positive model is unable to prevent the disease becoming
an epidemic. Only the baseline with social distancing model contained the spread of the
disease with good results (within 90 days and less than 600 agents infected).
A closer observation of the results from the positive model showed that the disease
appeared initially contained within the first year (300 days) of the disease (see Figure
23a), but then the incidence rate rose during the next 75 days transforming it into an
epidemic with a result close to the CDC estimate (i.e., approximately 53 million affected
in the positive model compared to CDC’s estimate of approximately 61 million affected
individuals). This presents an opportunity to apply more policy interventions methods
within the first year of an outbreak to further curtail the spread of the disease if this model
configuration is adopted as the target population. The results of the baseline with social
distancing model lends support to this as it showed that limiting agents contact can contain
the disease at this scenario.
5.2.4 Simulation for R0 = 3
The key results for the simulation at R0 = 3 is summarized in Table 5. Figure 24 shows
the simulation plots of the results and images showing the spread of the disease at selected
time steps are showing in Figure 25.
Table 5: Summary simulation results for R0 = 3
Number Currently Sick Total Infected
Duration N (Max) % Day(s) occurred Mean Std. Dev. N %
Baseline 300 22,277,209 8.09 124 2727405.28 5613491.74 173,937,468 63.19
Baseline w/sd 86 100 3.63 x 10−5 22, 23 48.30 31.13 879 31.93 x 10−5
Negative config. 278 21,183,784 7.70 113 2733224.88 5401129.15 161,522,667 58.68




Figure 24: Plots of (a) the Number Currently Sick, and (b) Total Infected for simulation
at R0 = 3. At this scenario, the disease is a severe pandemic in the case of the baseline and
negative models. The disease burdens in both models affected more than half the population
in both cases indicative of its severity (58% and 63% of the population respectively). The
impact of the disease in the positive model was also significant as it affected up to 35% of
the population (exceeding CDC’s estimate which affected about 20% of the population).
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Figure 25: Selected images showing the spread of the disease in the population at R0 = 3.
The images capture the spread of the disease in the population on four randomly selected
days—day 80, 100, 300, and 461. Because of the similarity in the model results of the
baseline and negative models, the spread patterns also look alike but offset by a few days.
However, the infection is not visually obvious in the case of the positive model at the time
steps selected here.
5.2.4.1 Discussion of results for R0 = 3
At this scenario, the pandemic is quite severe affecting more than half of the population in
both the baseline and negative models (about 63% and 59% of the population respectively).
The pandemic was also significant in the case of the positive model (affecting about 35%
of the population) indicative that the target population as constituted (by attitudes and
resolutions) would not be able to contain the disease. The disease was however contained
in the baseline with social distancing model which suggests that in the case of the target
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population (the positive model), additional policy measures are needed in addition to the
favorable attitudes and resolutions of the population.
5.2.5 Simulation for R0 = 3.6
The key results for the simulation at R0 = 3.6 are summarized in Table 6. The simulation
plots for the current incidence and disease burden are shown in Figure 26 and images
showing the spread of the disease at selected time steps are shown in Figure 27.
Table 6: Summary simulation results for R0 = 3.6
Number Currently Sick Total Infected
Duration N (Max) % Day(s) occurred Mean Std. Dev. N %
Baseline 215 35,135,908 12.76 98 4497712.21 8967534.90 205,566,117 74.68
Baseline w/sd 668 2,852,286 1.04 310 485015.99 817828.98 68,869,972 25.02
Negative config. 216 32,599,689 11.84 90 4118200.73 8305350.80 189,093,045 68.69




Figure 26: Plots of the simulation results for R0 = 3.6. Plots of (a) the Number Currently
Sick and (b) the Total Infected for the simulation at R0 = 3.6. At this scenario the disease
resulted in a pandemic in all the models simulated (exceeding the CDC estimate). The
baseline and negative models both have a significant spike in the incidence rate (with over
30 million agents infected at in just one day).
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Figure 27: Selected images showing the spread of the disease in the population at R0 = 3.6.
The images capture the spread of the disease in the population on four randomly selected
days—day 80, 100, 300, and 461. The infection is very severe and very wide-spread in the
population within 100 days in both the baseline and largely negative models. By day 215,
the infection was mostly over in all the models except the baseline with social distancing
model (not shown here).
5.2.5.1 Discussion of results for R0 = 3.6
At this scenario, the disease resulted in a pandemic in all the models tested. In the baseline
and negative model, the disease manifested as a very severe pandemic with attack rates
greater than 10% and affecting a significant portion of the population in both models (75%
and 69% of the population respectively). The disease is also severe in the positive model
affecting 60% of the population. Even for the baseline with social distancing model where
the probability of contact is reduced by half, 25% of the population was still affected by
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the disease. This suggests that attitudes alone are not sufficient to contain and mitigate
the disease at this scenario. The virus is quite virulent here so a combination of strategies
would be needed to mitigate and contain it. This is consistent with what other researchers
have noted—that a combination of mitigation and containment strategies such as the use
of antivirals (used as a prophylactic and/or therapeutic drug), vaccination (for example,
targeted vaccination), and social distancing (even including personal hygiene) are needed to
effectively contain a highly virulent strain of pandemic influenza virus [100, 101, 181, 303,
293].
5.2.6 Simulation for R0 = 4
The key results for this scenario is summarized in Table 7. The simulation plots showing the
current incidence and disease burden are shown in Figure 28 and selected images showing
the spread of the disease at specific time steps during the simulation are shown in Figure 29.
Table 7: Summary simulation results for R0 = 4
Number Currently Sick Total Infected
Duration N (Max) % Day(s) occurred Mean Std. Dev. N %
Baseline 191 43,190,451 15.69 85 5402050.47 10970917.50 219,343,798 79.68
Baseline w/sd 580 6,450,647 2.34 225 829549.99 1660018.13 102,278,474 37.15
Negative config. 187 40,430,006 14.69 78 5067307.66 10246295.19 201,444,997 73.18




Figure 28: Plots of (a) the Number Currently Sick, and (b) the Total Infected, for the
simulation at R0 = 4. The disease is very severe at this scenario for all the models affecting
up to 80% of the population in the worst case (the baseline model) and over one-third (37%)
of the population in the best case (baseline with social distancing). The disease circulated
for a shorter duration (less than a year) in all the models except the baseline with social
distancing model.
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Figure 29: Selected images showing the spread of the disease in the population at R0 = 4.
The images capture the spread of the disease in the population on four randomly selected
days—day 70, 85, 109, and 145. The virulence of the virus can be seen by the intensity of
the map and the day of occurrence (earlier than the previous scenarios).
5.2.6.1 Discussion of results for R0 = 4
For this case, the disease was much more severe than the previous scenarios. Here it
affected almost the entire population of agents in the baseline and negative models—80%
of the population or 219 million agents in the baseline and 73% of the population or 201
million agents in the negative model. The severity of the disease is further underscored by
its short duration or period of circulation in the population. Its virulence can be seen in
Figure 28 where the disease affected over 40 million people in one day at its peak (day 85
and 78 in the baseline and negative models). This is about 15% of the population infected
in just one day in both models. The disease was also virulent in the positive model where it
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infected more than 7% of the population in just one day and more than half the population
(58% or 160 million agents) over its course of duration. It also had a similar effect in the
baseline with social distancing model where it infected 2% of the population in one day (at
its peak) and more than one-third of the population (37% or 102 million agents) over the
duration of the simulation.
The results of this simulation suggest that the current recommendations and target
population configuration (as set in the positive model) are insufficient to curtail the spread
of the disease. Even the model where all contact is limited by 50% was also inadequate. This
suggests the need of more strategies to contain the disease outbreak, possibly a combination
of strategies as noted in the previous discussion (Section 5.2.5.1).
5.3 Discussion of Simulations
The models simulated for this study were chosen to include only the most basic features
essential for investigating the spatial patterns of pandemic influenza spread in the U.S.
population. I have omitted many features and made considerable approximations in the
features included. Hence, it is appropriate to discuss some of the shortcomings of the models
before interpreting the results.
As previously noted, Influenza outbreaks typically occur in multiple outbreaks or suc-
cessive “waves4” [179, 266, 200, 131], and vary greatly in severity during the outbreaks
[140, 176]. However, the mechanism responsible for the multiple waves of infection is un-
certain [207]. Recent pandemic influenza history shows that the infection spreads mostly in
two waves—a mild first wave followed by a severe second wave [266, 200, 131]. This was the
case during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak5 in the U.S. The infection came in two waves—June
and late October 2009 with the latter the deadlier [142]. So this means that the incidence
curve for the actual data will show a two-wave profile.
Despite the multiple-wave nature of the outbreak of the disease, most of the infection
4Three waves of incidence and mortality were seen in the 1918 influenza pandemic in London, England
[132].
5Merler et al. note that while the pandemic occurred in two waves in the U.K. (a first wave in early
summer and a second wave in autumn), the rest of Europe experienced a single wave (in autumn/winter)
[194].
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(in terms of morbidity and mortality) is often attributed to just one of the outbreak waves,
thus, modelers often approximate the epidemic curve with one wave for model simplicity
[186, 133, 187]. For example, scholars such as [114, 179, 125, 13] assumed6 a single-wave
epidemic curve in their works. I followed this same approach in this study and assumed
the epidemic curve of the outbreak modeled follows a single-wave pattern. However, this
assumption may have implications for the actual pattern of spread of the disease and may
lead to different results and conclusions (as measured by the disease burden). The general
belief is that this difference in model results (between a single-wave and multiple-wave
epidemic curve pattern) is often insignificant and within acceptable limits of the morbidity
and mortality rates of most influenza outbreaks. A visual comparison of a single-wave and
double-wave epidemic curves is shown in Figure 30 to aid understanding.
6Their bases for this assumption may vary. For example, Longini et al. [179] explored the most effective
strategies for the use of antiviral drugs to contain the disease at the onset of the first wave thus avoiding




Figure 30: Visual comparison of incidence curves of the 2009 outbreak for the actual and
simulated data to highlight the double-waved and single-waved nature of a disease outbreak.
Figure (a) is the incidence curve for the actual transmission (Figure source: [142, p. S14]),
and (b) is the incidence curve for the simulated scenario using R0 = 2.6.
Another concern is the use of the basic infectiousness number, R0, as a good measure
of disease transmissibility. First, estimating a value for R0 is challenging as it is a complex
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measurement to make and thus the estimation in practice is often near arbitrary and not
precise [186, 134, 290]. Infection transmissibility is a heterogeneous, complex, and dynamic
phenomenon that depends on factors such as pathogenic genetic diversity, host biology, the
environment, heterogeneity in human contact networks, and behavior. For example, differ-
ent levels of transmissibility are known to occur in different households and communities
during pandemic influenza outbreaks [180, 52, 50]. Also, secondary attacks of the virus
exist and contribute significantly to the transmissibility of the disease [180, 125]. Second,
R0 is not constant throughout the population [282, 186, 134]. However, here as in other
similar studies [114, 179, 52], R0 is assumed to be constant throughout the population and
for the duration of the simulation for model simplicity reasons.
The vaccination approach employed in this work also has a number of concerns. Typi-
cally, the vaccine deployed during a pandemic outbreak is delivered in doses and staged (i.e.,
applied in phases targeted first to those deemed at greatest risk, for example, to school-
aged children and the elderly [181, 303]). This is because of the delay in manufacturing
homologous-matched vaccines to provide immunity to the novel virus (this gives rise to
the supply and distribution issues). It is therefore quite difficult to deploy vaccines to a
very large portion of the population in a single day as assumed in this thesis (30 million
individual agents vaccinated on day 30). This may impact the population differently if a
staged approach were employed.
In terms of the vaccination coverage, 10% of the agent population was vaccinated in
MASSAPIS to approximate the low vaccination coverage7 which occurred during the 2009
outbreak. However, vaccinating just 10% of the population universally without any strategy
or target is not recommended to achieve good results [100, 101, 181, 303]. Rather a higher
coverage is suggested. For example, Yang et al. [303] suggest strategies with a coverage of
up to 50% for R0 < 1.6 and 70% otherwise to obtain a better mitigating effect.
A lot of assumptions are also made by modelers because of the challenges of incorpo-
rating the dynamics of human behavior in infectious disease models [89, 98, 107]. In this
7For the 2009 outbreak, vaccine coverage varied widely among subpopulations and less than 10% of the
population was vaccinated [36].
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thesis, the attitudes and resolutions developed are simplifications of very complex processes
and may not adequately represent human motivation and behavior. However, since there
is a need to capture more of human behavior into disease models, a simple approximation
like this is needed as a first step in developing more complex models.
Finally, the assumptions regarding the contact pattern is one of the key determinants
of the outcome of population models like this because the contact pattern plays a vital role
in shaping disease outcomes [233, 277, 193]. Unfortunately, a lot is still unknown about
how different levels of population heterogeneity and patterns of human mobility affect the
progression of pandemic influenza during an outbreak. Since disease incidence tend to occur
in spatial clusters during the initial stages of an outbreak, how agents form clusters in the
model can highly influence the spread of disease. The distribution and movement of people
(which is strongly driven by the population density) acts as a strong determinant of the
spread. As a result, census-derived movements patterns are commonly used to describe
population density in models [235]. MASSAPIS incorporates the census-driven movement
patterns used to describe the contact itinerary of agents in GSAM. The contact patterns in
the model can be considered as reasonably good approximations.
5.3.1 Summary of the Key Results
A summary plot of the key results obtained from the simulations is presented in Figure 31.
As the disease transmissibility R0 is increased, the number of those currently sick (current
incidence) and total infected (disease burden) increases while the duration declines. This
result is not surprising and is consistent with what others have reported [100, 101, 181,
303]. Essentially, as the virulence of a virus increases, the faster it will circulate through a
population, the shorter the duration will be, and a greater number of people it will affect.
The impact of this transmissibility on the duration of the disease is not easy to interpret
because of the evolutionary nature of agent-based models (see Figure 31b). The results from
this study suggest that the virus in the baseline and negative models initially circulated for a
relatively longer time period than the positive model until the disease got severe (R0 > 2.0).




Figure 31: Summary of the overall key results obtained for each simulation. Summary plot
of (a) the day with the highest disease incidence, (b) duration of the disease, and (c) the
disease burden (total infected) for the six simulations.
87
and negative models. However, as the virulence increased, the duration of the simulations
in the baseline, negative, and positive models appear to converge towards the same value.
This suggests that the structural advantages embedded in the positive model by construction
(i.e., the favorable attitude and resolutions) erode as the level of the severity of the virus
increases. The result of the baseline with social distancing model appears to follow the
same pattern.
So the advantages of the positive model (where the population is more inclined to
adopt the protective recommendations) diminish as the severity of the disease increases.
By R0 = 3, almost 35% of the population (100 million agents) was affected by the virus
compared to about 20% (53 million agents) at R0 = 2.6. It may be possible to obtain an
improvement in this result by increasing the configuration of attitudes in the model to be
more positive. For instance, increasing the positive attitude from 75% to a value closer to
100% to represent a population with a more highly positive attitude demographic. However,
this will not be sufficient to contain a very severe form of the disease. The results of the
baseline model with social distancing suggests that limiting contact alone will also not suffice
to contain the disease at high levels of severity. Rather a policy that involves a combination
of strategies would be needed to contain the disease at this level [100, 101, 181, 303, 293].
For example, implementing a combination of strategies such as a more targeted vaccination
scheme (the most at risk of infection) along with vaccinating more agents in the population
(increasing vaccination rates to at least 50% of the population may give better results).
Implementing an improved social distancing scheme along with targeted vaccination and
an improved attitude configuration will help to mitigate and control a disease at very high
levels of severity.
It should be noted that the impact of the disease transmissibility on the simulation
results is not entirely easy to extrapolate because of the evolutionary nature of agent-based
models. Because agent-based models are generative models [86], extrapolating the impact
of one factor on one of the outcomes is not straightforward. For example, reducing the
contact rate by one-half as was done in the baseline model with social distancing model does
not necessarily translate into a corresponding reduction in disease incidence and burden.
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Similarly, doubling R0 from say 2 to 4 does not directly translate to a doubling of disease
incidence or burden.
5.4 Summary
In this Chapter, the results of the simulations obtained from MASSAPIS was presented,
the validation method employed described, and a discussion of the results given.
To evaluate the potential for mitigating and controlling an outbreak of pandemic in-
fluenza A/H1N1 by varying the attitudes and resolutions of agents in the U.S. population,
four models were simulated at six scenarios of disease transmissibility using R0 values of
1.6, 2, 2.6, 3, 3.6 and 4. The four models where configured to represent different behavioral
approximations of the population. The baseline model represented a population without any
intervention, the baseline with social distancing model represented a population with con-
tact reduced by 50%, the negative model represented current behavior in the population,
and the positive model represented the target population with more improved behaviors
(attitudes and resolutions) and thus better inclined to adopting preventive health recom-
mendations during an outbreak.
The results indicate that while improving the attitudes and resolutions of the popula-
tion from a largely negative to a positive position improved mitigation and containment
strategies, the benefits of this intervention begin to diminish as the severity of the disease
increases. And after a certain point, a combination of strategies that includes improved





The goals of this dissertation have been to investigate how changes in human behavior
impact the spread of pandemic influenza spread in the U.S. using an agent-based com-
putational model suitable for analyzing the spatial spread of the disease. The objectives
include:
1. To develop a computational framework that can model aspects of spontaneous human
behaviors for infectious disease analysis. Specifically, the attitudes and resolutions of
individuals in a population towards government-issued advisory information during
the outbreak;
2. To research how the transmissibility of the influenza virus affects disease incidence
and burden during an outbreak.
Results of the first objective include the design and implementation of MASSAPIS,
a computational framework capable of modeling human behavior for pandemic influenza
spread analysis. MASSAPIS builds upon and extends the GSAM platform developed by
Parker and Epstein [219]. MASSAPIS is written in Java and is designed in a modular form
to encourage future extensions.
MASSAPIS adopts a multi-agent based simulation paradigm where individuals in the
population are represented as virtual agents. The agent population is based on the 2010
U.S. Census data. Social behavior is simulated using each agent’s pre-defined itinerary
based on any of the following: family, work, or random itinerary events. It is this itinerary
movement that determines the probability of agent-to-agent contact that drives disease
transmission in the model. The distinctive feature of MASSAPIS is the endowment of
agents in the model with attitudes and resolutions towards adopting advisory information
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disseminated by the government during the outbreak and the impact it has on the spread
of the disease. Two main preventive behaviors are currently built into MASSAPIS—social
distancing and vaccination; three attitude attributes—positive, negative, or neutral; and
three types of resolutions—inclined, opposed, and indifferent postures towards adopting the
recommended preventive behaviors to limit infection. Together, these variables influence
an agent’s probability of infection and dynamics of the disease spread.
There have been many important models developed to investigate public health ques-
tions related to the mitigation and control of pandemic influenza. However, many are not
spatial population models that can be used to clearly answer the question posed in this
thesis. They lack the incorporation of human behavior changes and how it affects disease
prevalence. MASSAPIS represents a modeling paradigm where infectious disease dynamics
and behavior are incorporated into the same framework in an interdependent way.
6.2 Future Directions
Incorporation of a more detailed psychological behavior process into MASSAPIS constitutes
a potential additional research focus. This dissertation emphasizes the incorporation of
attitudes and resolutions as behavior characteristics into behavior-disease models. However,
how to endogenize a more detailed behavior decision process into disease models remains an
open question. Incorporating more detailed behavior mechanisms in these kinds of models
will allow for more accurate representation of the population and thus improved model
realism. However, this introduces further computational complexities into the system. So
pending the development of cheaper and faster computational resources that can support
these kinds of frameworks, simpler approximations will have to suffice.
Exploring ways that social media sentiment can be incorporated into MASSAPIS such
that it can capture real-time population-level sentiments is another interesting line of re-
search to explore [146, 59]. Since aggregate sentiments of subpopulations can be fairly easily
extracted from social media, they could be used as a better proxy for attitudes in the frame-
work. Already, Twitter has been analyzed as a source for studying behavioral responses to
epidemics [161, 162, 241, 258]. For example, vaccination sentiments can be extracted and
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matched to resolutions taken to eventually accept or reject the vaccine [40, 244]. Ideally,
sentiments would be extracted dynamically and used daily to obtain a more realistic repre-
sentation of attitudes and resolutions in the population. Disease incidence reports can also
be derived from social media and used to update CDC’s influenza-like-illness (ILI) activity
report, which is used as ground truth regarding the number of those affected by the disease
in this study.
Identifying and expanding the role of movement and travel on the dynamics of pandemic
influenza may represent another valuable direction for future research. Currently, the agents
in MASSAPIS implement just one itinerary out of the following predefined three—family,
work/school, and random. But their capabilities can be extended to include other itineraries
such as air travel, road travel, and hospital visits that are certainly factors that can influence
the spread of infection during an outbreak. Expanding the role of movement and travel
to include additional itineraries can greatly enhance the ability get better results from
MASSAPIS.
Improving the vaccination scheme from the universal approach currently employed to a
targeted scheme which is more realistic may also represent a useful future research focus.
Since vaccination is widely regarded as the most effective way to contain the spread, it makes
good sense to implement a vaccination scheme targeted at certain individuals considered
more vulnerable to the disease in the population, for example, school-age children, the
elderly, and health workers [93, 179, 125, 270].
Last but not least, further studies in computational epidemiology are needed to help
produce higher resolution models that move us closer towards better model realism. This
should be a multi-disciplinary approach that will bring researchers from fields ranging from
the social sciences to the health sciences to computing sciences to help design the next
generation of models that will better incorporate the dynamics of human behavior into
behavior-disease models such as MASSAPIS.
92
REFERENCES
[1] “WHO | Influenza,” jan 2008.
[2] “Forbidden Truth on Stockpiling of Pandemic Flu Drugs,” jun 2010.
[3] Abbey, H., “An examination of the reed-frost theory of epidemics,” Human biology,
vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 201–233, 1952.
[4] Air, G. M. and Laver, W. G., “The neuraminidase of influenza virus,” Proteins:
Structure, Function, and Bioinformatics, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 341–356, 1989.
[5] Ajelli, M., Gonalves, B., Balcan, D., Colizza, V., Hu, H., Ramasco,
J. J., Merler, S., and Vespignani, A., “Comparing large-scale computational ap-
proaches to epidemic modeling: Agent-based versus structured metapopulation mod-
els,” BMC Infectious Diseases, vol. 10, p. 190, June 2010. PMID: 20587041.
[6] Ajzen, I., From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior. Springer, 1985.
[7] Ajzen, I., “The theory of planned behavior,” Organizational behavior and human
decision processes, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 179–211, 1991.
[8] Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M., “Understanding attitudes and predicting social behav-
ior,” Behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
[9] Alexander, D. J., “A review of avian influenza in different bird species,” Veterinary
microbiology, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 3–13, 2000.
[10] Anderson, R. M., May, R. M., and Anderson, B., Infectious diseases of humans:
dynamics and control, vol. 28. Wiley Online Library, 1992.
[11] Andersson, H. and Britton, T., Stochastic epidemic models and their statistical
analysis, vol. 151. Springer New York, 2000.
[12] Andreasen, V., Viboud, C., and Simonsen, L., “Epidemiologic characterization of
the 1918 influenza pandemic summer wave in copenhagen: implications for pandemic
control strategies,” Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 197, no. 2, pp. 270–278, 2008.
[13] Arinaminpathy, N. and McLean, A., “Logistics of control for an influenza pan-
demic,” Epidemics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 83–88, 2009.
[14] Axelrod, R. M., The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-based Models of Competi-
tion and Collaboration. Princeton University Press, 1997.
[15] Bagni, R., Berchi, R., and Cariello, P., “A comparison of simulation models
applied to epidemics,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 5,
no. 3, 2002.
[16] Baier, A., “Trust and antitrust,” Ethics, pp. 231–260, 1986.
93
[17] Bailey, N. T. and others, The mathematical theory of infectious diseases and its
applications. Charles Griffin & Company Ltd, 5a Crendon Street, High Wycombe,
Bucks HP13 6LE., 1975.
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[244] Salathé, M. and Khandelwal, S., “Assessing vaccination sentiments with online
social media: implications for infectious disease dynamics and control,” PLoS Comput
Biol, vol. 7, no. 10, p. e1002199, 2011.
[245] Sanchez, A., Ebola Viruses. Wiley Online Library, 2001.
[246] Sander, B., Nizam, A., Garrison, L. P., Postma, M. J., Halloran, M. E., and
Longini, I. M., “Economic evaluation of influenza pandemic mitigation strategies in
the united states using a stochastic microsimulation transmission model,” Value in
Health, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 226–233, 2009.
109
[247] Schuchat, A., Bell, B. P., and Redd, S. C., “The science behind preparing
and responding to pandemic influenza: the lessons and limits of science,” Clinical
Infectious Diseases, vol. 52, no. suppl 1, pp. S8–S12, 2011.
[248] Schultz-Cherry, S., Webby, R., Webster, R., Kelso, A., Barr, I., Mc-
Cauley, J., Daniels, R., Wang, D., Shu, Y., Nobusawa, E., and others,
“Influenza gain-of-function experiments: their role in vaccine virus recommendation
and pandemic preparedness,” MBio, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. e02430–14, 2014.
[249] Schulze, I. T., “The biologically active proteins of influenza virus: the hemagglu-
tinin,” The influenza virus and influenza, pp. 53–83, 1975.
[250] Schwarzinger, M., Verger, P., Guerville, M.-A., Aubry, C., Rolland, S.,
Obadia, Y., and Moatti, J.-P., “Positive attitudes of french general practitioners
towards a/h1n1 influenza-pandemic vaccination: a missed opportunity to increase
vaccination uptakes in the general public?,” Vaccine, vol. 28, no. 15, pp. 2743–2748,
2010.
[251] Seal, H. L., “Studies in the history of probability and statistics. xxxv: Multiple
decrements or competing risks,” Biometrika, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 429–439, 1977.
[252] Seale, H., Heywood, A. E., McLaws, M.-L., Ward, K. F., Lowbridge, C. P.,
Van, D., and MacIntyre, C. R., “Why do i need it? i am not at risk! public
perceptions towards the pandemic (h1n1) 2009 vaccine,” BMC infectious diseases,
vol. 10, no. 1, p. 99, 2010.
[253] Setbon, M. and Raude, J., “Factors in vaccination intention against the pandemic
influenza a/h1n1,” The European Journal of Public Health, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 490–494,
2010.
[254] Shapiro, S. P., “The social control of impersonal trust,” American journal of Soci-
ology, pp. 623–658, 1987.
[255] Sheeran, P., “Intentionbehavior relations: A conceptual and empirical review,”
European review of social psychology, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1–36, 2002.
[256] Shim, E., “Prioritization of delayed vaccination for pandemic influenza,” Mathemat-
ical biosciences and engineering: MBE, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 95, 2011.
[257] Shrestha, S. S., Swerdlow, D. L., Borse, R. H., Prabhu, V. S., Finelli,
L., Atkins, C. Y., Owusu-Edusei, K., Bell, B., Mead, P. S., Biggerstaff,
M., and others, “Estimating the burden of 2009 pandemic influenza a (h1n1) in the
united states (april 2009–april 2010),” Clinical Infectious Diseases, vol. 52, no. suppl
1, pp. S75–S82, 2011.
[258] Signorini, A., Segre, A. M., and Polgreen, P. M., “The use of twitter to track
levels of disease activity and public concern in the us during the influenza a h1n1
pandemic,” PloS one, vol. 6, no. 5, p. e19467, 2011.
[259] Smith, K. F., Sax, D. F., and Lafferty, K. D., “Evidence for the role of infectious
disease in species extinction and endangerment,” Conservation Biology, vol. 20, no. 5,
pp. 1349–1357, 2006.
110
[260] Smith, W., Andrewes, C., and Laidlaw, P., “A virus obtained from influenza
patients,” The Lancet, vol. 222, no. 5732, pp. 66–68, 1933.
[261] Sniehotta, F. F., Scholz, U., and Schwarzer, R., “Bridging the intention–
behaviour gap: Planning, self-efficacy, and action control in the adoption and main-
tenance of physical exercise,” Psychology & Health, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 143–160, 2005.
[262] SteelFisher, G. K., Blendon, R. J., Bekheit, M. M., and Lubell, K., “The
public’s response to the 2009 h1n1 influenza pandemic,” New England Journal of
Medicine, vol. 362, no. 22, 2010.
[263] Steinhauer, D. A., “Role of hemagglutinin cleavage for the pathogenicity of in-
fluenza virus,” Virology, vol. 258, no. 1, pp. 1–20, 1999.
[264] Sturgis, P. and Smith, P., “Assessing the validity of generalized trust questions:
what kind of trust are we measuring?,” International Journal of Public Opinion Re-
search, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 74–92, 2010.
[265] Taber, C. S. and Timpone, R. J., Computational modeling. No. 7-113, Sage, 1996.
[266] Taubenberger, J. K. and Morens, D. M., “1918 influenza: the mother of all
pandemics,” Rev Biomed, vol. 17, pp. 69–79, 2006.
[267] Taylor, R., “Studies on survival of influenza virus between epidemics and antigenic
variants of the virus*,” American Journal of Public Health and the Nations Health,
vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 171–178, 1949.
[268] Thompson, T. and Thompson, E. S., Influenza or epidemic catarrhal fever: an
historical survey of past epidemics in Great Britain from 1510 to 1890. Percival and
Company, 1890.
[269] Tong, S., Zhu, X., Li, Y., Shi, M., Zhang, J., Bourgeois, M., Yang, H.,
Chen, X., Recuenco, S., Gomez, J., and others, “New world bats harbor diverse
influenza a viruses,” PLoS pathogens, vol. 9, no. 10, p. e1003657, 2013.
[270] Torun, S. D., Torun, F., and Catak, B., “Healthcare workers as parents: atti-
tudes toward vaccinating their children against pandemic influenza a/h1n1,” BMC
Public Health, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–6, 2010.
[271] Trifonov, V., Khiabanian, H., and Rabadan, R., “Geographic dependence,
surveillance, and origins of the 2009 influenza a (h1n1) virus,” New England Journal
of Medicine, vol. 361, no. 2, pp. 115–119, 2009.
[272] Tuite, A. R., Fisman, D. N., Kwong, J. C., and Greer, A. L., “Optimal
pandemic influenza vaccine allocation strategies for the canadian population,” PloS
one, vol. 5, no. 5, p. e10520, 2010.
[273] Ungchusak, K., Auewarakul, P., Dowell, S. F., Kitphati, R., Auwanit, W.,
Puthavathana, P., Uiprasertkul, M., Boonnak, K., Pittayawonganon, C.,
Cox, N. J., and others, “Probable person-to-person transmission of avian influenza
a (h5n1),” New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 352, no. 4, pp. 333–340, 2005.
[274] US Census Bureau, D. I. D., “Population Estimates,” 2015.
111
[275] Valenciano, M., Kissling, E., Cohen, J.-M., Oroszi, B., Barret, A.-S.,
Rizzo, C., Nunes, B., Pitigoi, D., Larrauri Camara, A., Mosnier, A., and
others, “Estimates of pandemic influenza vaccine effectiveness in europe, 2009-2010:
Results of influenza monitoring vaccine effectiveness in europe (l-move) multicentre
case-control study,” PLoS medicine, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 176, 2011.
[276] Vermeire, E., Hearnshaw, H., Van Royen, P., and Denekens, J., “Patient
adherence to treatment: three decades of research. a comprehensive review,” Journal
of clinical pharmacy and therapeutics, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 331–342, 2001.
[277] Viboud, C., Bjørnstad, O. N., Smith, D. L., Simonsen, L., Miller, M. A.,
and Grenfell, B. T., “Synchrony, waves, and spatial hierarchies in the spread of
influenza,” science, vol. 312, no. 5772, pp. 447–451, 2006.
[278] Viboud, C., Miller, M. A., Grenfell, B. T., Bjørnstad, O. N., and Simon-
sen, L., “Air travel and the spread of influenza: important caveats,” PLoS Medicine,
vol. 3, no. 11, p. e503, 2006.
[279] Viboud, C., Tam, T., Fleming, D., Handel, A., Miller, M. A., and Simonsen,
L., “Transmissibility and mortality impact of epidemic and pandemic influenza, with
emphasis on the unusually deadly 1951 epidemic,” Vaccine, vol. 24, no. 44, pp. 6701–
6707, 2006.
[280] Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behav-
ior (60th Anniversary Commemorative Edition). Princeton university press, 2007.
[281] Wake, D. B. and Vredenburg, V. T., “Are we in the midst of the sixth mass ex-
tinction? a view from the world of amphibians,” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, vol. 105, no. Supplement 1, pp. 11466–11473, 2008.
[282] Wallinga, J. and Lipsitch, M., “How generation intervals shape the relationship
between growth rates and reproductive numbers,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of
London B: Biological Sciences, vol. 274, no. 1609, pp. 599–604, 2007.
[283] Wang, Y. D. and Emurian, H. H., “An overview of online trust: Concepts, ele-
ments, and implications,” Computers in human behavior, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 105–125,
2005.
[284] Webster, R. G., Bean, W. J., Gorman, O. T., Chambers, T. M., and
Kawaoka, Y., “Evolution and ecology of influenza a viruses.,” Microbiological re-
views, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 152–179, 1992.
[285] Webster, R. G. and Govorkova, E. A., “H5n1 influenzacontinuing evolution and
spread,” New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 355, no. 21, pp. 2174–2177, 2006.
[286] Weerd, W. v. d., Timmermans, D. R., Beaujean, D. J., Oudhoff, J., and
Steenbergen, J. E. v., “Monitoring the level of government trust, risk perception
and intention of the general public to adopt protective measures during the influenza
a (H1N1) pandemic in the netherlands,” BMC Public Health, vol. 11, p. 575, July
2011. PMID: 21771296.
[287] Weinstein, N. D., “Misleading tests of health behavior theories,” Annals of Behav-
ioral Medicine, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 1–10, 2007.
112
[288] Weinstein, N. D., Kwitel, A., McCaul, K. D., Magnan, R. E., Gerrard,
M., and Gibbons, F. X., “Risk perceptions: assessment and relationship to influenza
vaccination.,” Health Psychology, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 146, 2007.
[289] Weis, W., Brown, J., Cusack, S., Paulson, J., Skehel, J., and Wiley, D.,
“Structure of the influenza virus haemagglutinin complexed with its receptor, sialic
acid,” Nature, vol. 333, no. 6172, pp. 426–431, 1988.
[290] White, L. F., Wallinga, J., Finelli, L., Reed, C., Riley, S., Lipsitch, M.,
and Pagano, M., “Estimation of the reproductive number and the serial interval in
early phase of the 2009 influenza a/h1n1 pandemic in the usa,” Influenza and other
respiratory viruses, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 267–276, 2009.
[291] White, M., “Source list and detailed death tolls for the primary megadeaths of the
twentieth century,” Feb. 2011.
[292] WHO, WHO Handbook for Journalists: Influenza Pandemic. World Health Organi-
zation, 2005.
[293] WHO, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: A WHO Guidance Docu-
ment. World Health Organization, 2009.
[294] WHO, “WHO | Global Influenza Programme,” 2016.
[295] Wiley, D. C. and Skehel, J. J., “The structure and function of the hemagglutinin
membrane glycoprotein of influenza virus,” Annual review of biochemistry, vol. 56,
no. 1, pp. 365–394, 1987.
[296] Wilson, I., Skehel, J., and Wiley, D., “Structure of the haemagglutinin mem-
brane glycoprotein of influenza virus at 3 å resolution,” Nature, vol. 289, no. 5796,
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